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Democracy has been one of the fundamental achievements in the post-World War 
II era.  Because evidence of the democratic peace exists, illiberal states are being 
pressured to form democracies.  However, democratic consolidation, on which the 
democratic peace relies, remains a persistent problem of the Third World.  Thus, the 
paradox remains that democratizing states are prone to violence which undermines peace 
and security.  Considering that the majority of states in the international community are 
mixed regimes, or anocracies, this poses a problem for reducing interstate and intrastate 
conflict in these regimes.  It is not enough to declare success with the establishment of 
electoral democracies; rather it is necessary to identify the political institutions that create 
mature democracies which validate the democratic peace. 
 
 This research seeks to explain the relationship between political institutions, the 
level of democratization, and conflict in anocracies.  Using a top-down approach to 
quantitatively test the years 1974 through 2000, this research examines the role of 
political institutions, such as constitutional structure, press freedom, free and fair 
elections, military accountability, as well as the legitimacy of the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches.  With theoretical grounding in literature on democratizing states 
(e.g. Snyder, Mansfield and Snyder), the waves of democracy (Diamond), political decay 
(Huntington), political development, and the democratic peace, this research suggests that 
there is a threshold effect regarding political institutions which must be established before 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 The promotion of democracy has been a defining characteristic of the post-World 
War II era.  It has been the focal point of American foreign policy, particularly in recent 
administrations.  Even before the term “democratic peace” transcended the academic 
community, President Ronald Reagan, in a 1982 speech before the British Parliament, 
proposed a “campaign for democratic development” based upon the belief that 
“governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise ‘restraint’ and 
‘peaceful intentions’ in their foreign policy” (Doyle 1986, p. 1151).  More than a decade 
later, President Bill Clinton advocated that support for democratization would be a 
remedy to international war and civil conflict.  In his 1994 State of the Union Address, 
President Clinton said, “(u)ltimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build 
a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere” because 
“(d)emocracies don't attack each other...”  President George W. Bush claimed in his 
Second Inaugural Address that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support 
the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation…”  In a speech 
before the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush declared,  
The work of democracy is larger than holding a fair election; it requires building 
the institutions that sustain freedom.  Democracy takes different forms in different 
cultures, yet all free societies have certain things in common.  Democratic nations 
uphold the rule of law, impose limits on the power of the state, treat women and 
minorities as full citizens.  Democratic nations protect private property, free 
speech and religious expression.  Democratic nations grow in strength because 
they reward and respect the creative gifts of their people.  And democratic nations 
contribute to peace and stability because they seek national greatness in the 






The United States is not the only entity advocating democratization.   Democracy 
promotion is also the goal of other Western democracies and international organizations 
such as the United Nations and European Union as “international dimensions of 
democratization moved to the center stage” (Grugel 2002, p. 116).  “The creation of a 
global political economy and the emergence of global governance mechanisms generate 
pressures for democratization” (Grugel 2002, p. 116).  With these developments, 
international organizations have begun to take an active role in the campaign for 
democracy.   
 According to Huntington, “the movement toward democracy (has taken) on the 
character of an almost irresistible global tide moving on from one triumph to the next” 
(1991, p. 21).  This recent pressure for states to democratize is centered in the democratic 
peace, which is the quantitatively established theory that democracies rarely, if ever, 
wage war on other democracies.  Recently successful elections in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and promising pro-democracy movements in Lebanon (although this fragile democracy is 
currently being tested), Egypt, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, and other states suggest that 
the United States, other Western democracies, and international organizations are 
promoting a policy that will ultimately contribute to international peace.  However, 
skeptics to the passivity of the democratic peace, namely Mansfield and Snyder, have 
provided a third, contradictory assumption to the optimism of the democratic peace.  
Mansfield and Snyder suggest that while the democratic peace holds for well-established 
democracies, states that are making the transition to democracy are more war prone, both 
internally and externally, than either democratic or authoritarian states and they will 





and Snyder, recent examples of democratizing war are the disintegration process of 
Yugoslavia, Armenia versus Azerbaijan, Peru versus Ecuador, Ethiopia versus Eritrea, 
India versus Pakistan, internal conflict in Rwanda concerning the Hutus versus Tutsis, 
and the secessionist movements in East Timor and Chechnya (2005, pp. 4-6). 
Contemporary democratizing states are often described with adjectives: 
pseudodemocracy, semi-democracy, illiberal democracy, authoritarian democracy, quasi 
democracy, electoral democracy, and so on.  These states are not mature or liberal 
democracies and they lack the characteristics that validate the democratic peace, upon 
which the recent democratization pressure lies.  As this dissertation’s title suggests, 
democracy by any other name just isn’t the same.  According to Mansfield and Snyder, 
anocracies, or democratizing states, are more prone to violence, which undermines peace 
and security.  Considering there is a “growing conviction that the expansion of 
democracy serves international peace and security” (Diamond 1995, p. 52), the 
international community should make more of an attempt to consolidate democracy as 
opposed to advancing pseudodemocracy.  
The two literatures that dominate this research, the democratic peace and 
democratization and war, create a paradox for academics and policy-makers alike.  
Because of the democratic peace, the proliferation of democracy is a constructive force in 
world politics, yet the democratization process is inherently dangerous which only serves 
to aggravate the hostilities intrinsic in international relations.  The end result is supposed 
to be cooperation between democracies, but before this can occur democratizing states 
are more at risk for heightened conflict. A major contribution of this dissertation is the 





attempt to reconcile the optimism of the democratic peace with the pessimism of the 
democratization and war literature by discovering the necessary and sufficient political 
institutions needed to consolidate democracy and thus authenticate the democratic peace. 
By identifying the critical political institutions, states can focus on strengthening these 
institutions, thereby reducing the amount of time they spend within the inherently violent 
democratizing process, and more quickly move towards democratic consolidation and the 
cooperation associated with the democratic peace. 
This research seeks to examine the relationship between political institutions, the 
level of democratization, and conflict in anocracies, which are democratizing states that 
exhibit traits of both authoritarian and democratic regimes.  A significant body of 
scholarly research has been conducted concerning democratic consolidation and political 
institutions (Huntington 1991; Diamond 1999, 1996; Diamond, et. al. 1997; Mansfield 
and Snyder 2005, 2002, 1995; Linz 1990; Linz and Stepan 1997, 1996; etc.); however, 
this work does not provide a comprehensive empirical assessment of political institutions 
for anocracies.  Using quantitative research for the time period 1974 through 2000, and 
introducing a political institutions threshold theory, this research attempts to provide a 
template concerning the political institutions that facilitate democratic consolidation, and 
by extension, the international peace and security that exists with the democratic peace. 
In an effort to understand the reasons why some states are able to consolidate 
democracy and then enjoy the passivity that exists among democratic states, several 
research questions have been developed.  Does the proliferation of democracy really 
contribute to world peace?  Is democracy promotion a valuable policy tool to ensure 





Mansfield and Snyder?   Which political institutions are necessary to ensure democratic 
consolidation and by extension prevent armed conflict through the validation of the 
democratic peace?  Is there a difference between governmental institutions and 
intermediary institutions in democratic consolidation and the prevention of armed 
conflict1?  Similar to the threshold that exists for the gross national product and literacy 
rates, is there an institutional threshold necessary for states to democratize2?   
In addition to the above questions, this dissertation tests three fundamental 
research questions.  First, are states that focus on building strong political institutions 
more likely to consolidate democracy?  Second, are states that focus on building strong 
political institutions more likely to avoid armed conflict?  And finally, is there a 
difference between governmental and intermediary institutions in the process of 
democratic consolidation?  These questions work in conjunction to identify those 
political institutions that play a critical role in the process of democratic consolidation, 
thereby creating mature democracies, which are not subject to armed conflict, and in turn 
validate the democratic peace.  These questions are tested in Chapters Five, Six, and 
Seven. 
 Map 1-1 displays the countries of interest to this dissertation research.  Based 
upon the coding rule for anocracies, or democratizing countries, 87 states qualify for 
inclusion in this research.  The institutional, democratic, and conflictual attributes of 
theses countries will be statistically analyzed during the years 1974, which is the start of 
the Third Wave of democratization, through 2000.  As the map indicates, the states are 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed discussion regarding the differences between governmental and intermediary 
institutions, see the section titled Governmental versus Intermediary Institutions in Chapter Three and the 
section titled Research Questions and Hypotheses in Chapter Four. 
2 For a more detailed discussion regarding the gross national product and literacy rate thresholds, see the 






































Map 1-1.Countries of Interest









There are some positive and negative observations that can be drawn based upon 
the state’s level of democratization in 2000.  Unfortunately, as Figure 1-1 indicates, most 
states of interest to this research are still classified as anocracies, or states that exhibit 
characteristics of both authoritarian and democratic regimes, in 2000.  This suggests that 
these countries are entrenched anocracies and are at a heightened risk for conflict through 
democratizing war.  However, there are positive observations as well.  The second and 
third most populous categories are democracy and anocracy leaning democratic.  This 
means that these countries are not becoming entrenched anocracies; rather they are 
moving towards democratic consolidation.  In addition, only 18% of the countries of 
interest have predominately authoritarian characteristics. 














As previously stated, all of the countries of interest to this dissertation research 
are located in the Global South.  Figure 1-2 denotes that nearly half of the 87 countries 
                                                 
3 The state’s Polity 2 score in 2000 determines their level of democratization.  The Polity 2 score is a 21-
point scale ranging from -10 to +10.  The breakdown for classification in Map 1-1 and Figure 1-1 occurs as 
follows: 
-10 to -7 = Authoritarian, -6 to -4 = Anocracy leaning Authoritarian, -3 to +3 = Anocracy, 4 to 6 = 






are located in Africa, with Asia, the Americas, and Europe making up the remaining 
percentages, respectively.  Only one state from Oceania, Fiji, qualified for inclusion on 
the research.  













s dissertation.  The chapter 
al 
 
The Outline of this Dissertation 
 Chapter Two reviews the literature relevant to this dissertation.  Although this 
dissertation is based within numerous different literatures, it is primarily concerned
the democratic peace and the democratization and war literatures.  The chapter begins 
with a discussion of the various definitions of democracy and then explains the working 
definition of democracy for this dissertation research.  This definition gives primacy 
political institutions.  Next, the chapter discusses the three different waves of 
democratization.  The Third Wave, which began in 1974 (Huntington 1991), provides the 
theoretical justification regarding the time frame for thi
continues with an explanation of the democratic peace and then addresses Mansfield and 
Snyder’s negative assertion in the democratization and war literature.  Next, the chapter 
examines the attributes of states that are more likely to cause involvement in armed 





decay and then concludes with an explanation of the preconditions for democra
discussed within the political development literature.   
 Chapter Three explains the theoretical argument of 
tization as 
the dissertation.  This chapter 
trodu






f a time-series panel regression.  Remaining consistent with previous 
ip 
nds 
by using a time-series panel regression to test the association 
in ces the institutional threshold theory, which suggests that there are necessary and 
sufficient political conditions with regard to institutions that must be strengthened before 
democratic consolidation can occur.  The chapter discusses the importance of political 
institutions to democratic consolidation.  Next, the chapter delineates between 
governmental and inte
c nent variables that make up the institutional index.  
 The research design of this dissertation is discussed in Chapter Four.  The ch
begins by providing the research questions and hypotheses.  Then the chapter explains th
operationalization of the dependent, independent, and control variables that are necessa
to this research, as well as an overview of the statistical methods and models used in the 
quantitative chapters. 
 Chapter Five is the first of three quantitative chapters that are necessary to test th
research questions, hypotheses, and the institutional threshold theory.  This chapter 
examines the relationship between political institutions and the level of democratization 
through the use o
literature, Chapter Six utilizes a time-series panel logit to test the statistical relationsh
between political institutions, the level of democratization, and a state’s involvement in a 
militarized interstate dispute (MID).  The final quantitative chapter, Chapter 7, expa





between political institutions, the lev tion, and their combined effect on 
armed c
answers the 




erformed on political institutions in 
nocracies.  Until now, the literature has focused on qualitative examinations of political 
institutions or has only examined a limi of political institutions.  This 
dissertation e  into an 
dex to allow for quantitative analysis.  Third, this dissertation will augment previous 
quantitative research by expanding the statistical techniques and applying the argument to 




 Finally, Chapter Eight explains the conclusions of this dissertation research.  
Drawing conclusions across the three quantitative chapters, this final chapter 
research questions and addresses the three hypotheses.  In addition, areas of future 
research are outlined.   
Contributions 
This dissertation makes s
s and comparative politics.  First, the institutional threshold theory is an attempt 
to reconcile the optimism of the democratic peace with the pessimism of the 
democratization and war literature.  In addition, the institutional threshold theory will 
attempt to identify the necessary and sufficient institutions which will enable dem
consolidation and by extension the passivity that exists among liberal democracies in the
form of the democratic peace.   
Second, the dissertation will introduce an institutional index which will allow for 
a comprehensive quantitative analysis to be p
a
ted number 







Optimism versus Pessimism: The Democratic Peace versus  
 
 
Democratization and War 
What is Democracy? 
 The most basic definition of democracy, which can be traced to ancient Greece, is 
the rule of the people.  Beyond this basic definition, there are many variations regarding 
the usage and employment of the term.  Direct democracy, which is also referred to as 
classical or pure democracy, indicates a political system in which the citizens make the 
laws themselves rather than choosing representatives to make the laws on their behalf.  
However, direct democracy, scholars have argued, can only exist in small states.  In the 
first experiment of democracy in Athens in ancient Greece until the 18  century, direct 
democracy defined the meaning of the term. 
 Although contemporary theories of democracy tend to emphasize indirect 
democracy as a practical matter in large modern nation-states, the essence of modern 
direct democracy is still present in the form of participatory democracy.  Participatory 
democracy seeks to involve the ordinary citizen more fully in the decision-making 
process.  The goal is for the citizens to rule themselves.  Participatory democracy 
involves extensive and active engagement of the citizens in the self-governing process; it 
means government not just for the people, but also by the people.  In fact, participatory 
democracy grants citizens the authority to decide on policies and politicians are 
responsible for policy implementation.  Participatory theorists, such as John Dewey and 
Benjamin Barber, believe that “the real benefits of democracy can only be appreciated 
and sustained by a society that is characterized by relatively high levels of citizen 






 Most contemporary theories employ an indirect version of democracy because the 








   
rests 
d 
for their interests, and in 
politics this means they form interest groups that request to be heard and affect policy.   
Representative democracy is delegating authority to chosen representatives who actuall
do the work of the government.  These representatives remain accountable to the citizen
through elections.  Representative democracy demotes citizens to the role of watchdogs. 
Thus, democracy comes to mean legitimation of representative officials through periodic 
elections. 
 Protective democracy asserts “government is driven by its dual and sometimes 
competing commitments to liberty, on one hand, and its attentiveness to mass politic
interest groups on the other” (Terchek and Conte 2001, p. 91).  In essence, the principa
task of the government is to protect the liberty of its citizens.  Advanced by theor
as Friedrich Hayek (1979) and Milton Friedman (1962), protective democrats believe that 
the modern democratic state has become intrusive by accepting responsibilities that 
should remain with the citizens.  In other words, the government should provide fo
minimum political arrangements that in turn will maximize freedom to its citizens.  
 Pluralist democracy suggests that interest groups form the foundation of 
democratic politics.  Pluralist theory indicates that individuals maintain “distinct inte
that need to be given the opportunity to be expressed politically” (Terchek and Conte 
2001, p. 123).  According to pluralists, a good democracy will allow like-minded 
individuals to gather and pursue their common interests.  Pluralist theorists such as 
Arthur Bentley (1908) and Robert Dahl (1982) suggest that free people with like-minde










eeply divided by religious, ethnic, or linguistic 
nd 
 
his definition reduces democracy to its basic 
on 
Performance democracy notes the shift away from the collective conception of 
politics to a more individualistic view, “namely that voters reference politics to their o
well-being and leaders search not for a common good but a strategy that will get th
elected or reelected” (Terchek and Conte 2001, p. 142).   
Consociational democracy is a type of representative government in which powe
sharing is institutionalized.  Consociational practices of democracy characterist
have existed in countries that are d
cleavages.  The intent of consociational democracy is to make certain that all the major 
segments in society are represented in the government in proportion to their size in the 
society.  Thus, power sharing implies that the government is a coalition of the 
representatives of the segments.   
 The procedural theory of democracy, established by Joseph Schumpeter, rejects 
the two cardinal premises of classical democracy – the belief in the common good a
the belief in the will of the people.  In its place, Schumpeter offered his own explanation 
of democracy as a method for arriving at collective decisions through the process of a
competitive struggle for people’s votes.  T
essentials – electoral politics.  Yet, procedural democracy is a method of reducing 
conflict through institutions that provide all citizens structured and limited participation 
in the discussion of issues and the choice of representatives.  The goal is to arrive at 
negotiated solutions that all can accept.   
 Substantive democracy, on the other hand, is more concerned with cooperati
and the idea that coercive institutions will eventually become unnecessary.  Substantive 





to procedural democracy, which is more focused on the institutionalized process of 





echanisms: control of government decision-making lies with elected 
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Alt
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• gnificant opposition 
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 the masses of society, regardless of the decision-making process.  According to
Dahl, “carried to an extreme, the insistence that substantive results take precedence over 
processes becomes a flatly antidemocratic justification for guardianship and ‘substant
democracy’ becomes a deceptive label for what is in fact a dictatorship” (1989, p. 163). 
According to a much employed contemporary definition of polyarchy, Dahl’s
term for the specific kind of democracy he describes, Dahl suggests that democracy has
the following m
s, elected officials are chosen through free and fair elections, inclusive suffr
the right to run for office, citizens have a right to freedom of expression, alternative 
information sources exist, and citizens have the right to form independent associations 
(1989, 1971). 
hough there are many definitions and types of democracy, this research 
nition of liberal democracy proposed by Diamond (1999) because it is
lly richer definition of democracy.  Diamond suggests that liberal democracies 
ing components:  
• Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies, in fact as 
well as constitutional theory, with elected officials (and not democratically 
unaccountable actors or foreign powers), in particular, the military is 
subordinate to the authority of elected civilian officials. 
 Executive power is constrained, constitutionally and in fa
autonomous power of other government institutions (such as an 
independent judiciary, parliament, and other mechanisms of horizontal
accountability). 
Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a si
vote and the presumption of party alterations in government, but no group 





and contest elections (even if electoral thresholds and other rules exclud
small parties from winning
e 
 representation in parliament). 
lly or in 
nels for 
and values, including 
ave the 
• on (including independent 
• 
• Citizens are politically equal under the law even though they are 
• Individual and group liberties are effectively protected by and 
and respected by other centers of power. 
 terror, 
torture, and undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state 
 
d on the 





• Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups (as well as 
historically disadvantaged majorities) are not prohibited (lega
practice) from expressing their interests in the political process or from 
speaking their language or practicing their culture. 
• Beyond parties and election, citizens have multiple, ongoing chan
expression and representation of their interests 
diverse, independent associations and movements, which they h
freedom to form and join. 
There are alternative sources of informati
media) to which citizens have (politically) unfettered access. 
Individuals also have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, 
speech, publication, assembly, demonstration, and petition. 
invariably unequal in their political resources. 
independent, nondiscriminatory judiciary, whose decisions are enforced 
• The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile,
but also by organized nonstate or antistate forces (1999, pp. 11-12). 
 Because the recent pressure from the international community is base
ry to utilize an institutionally 
since this type of state authenticates the democratic peace.  Diamond present an 
institutional checklist that explains how liberal democracy is superior to more minimal 
definitions of democracy, such as those that are described with adjectives.   
Waves of Democratization 
 According to Huntington, “a wave of democratization is a group of tran
ndemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time 
and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that perio
time” (1991, p. 15).  To date, there have been three waves of democratization.  





The first “‘long’ wave of democratization began in the 1820’s, with the wide
of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population
ning 
 in the United States, and 
continu
(Huntin arch on 
Rome i
(Huntington 1991-92, p. 579).  According to Huntington,  
the dominant political development of the 1920s and the 1930s was the shift away 
the introduction of mass-based, more brutal and pervasive forms of 
d adopted 
democratic forms just before or after World War I, where not only democracy was 





 of a reverse Third 
Wave and indication that the Third Wave is over (Diamond 1996).  The primary 
objective of the Third Wave states, and the international community, should be to prevent 
ed for almost a century until 1926, bringing into being some 29 democracies” 
gton 1996, p. 3).  The first reverse wave initiated with Mussolini’s m
n 1922, “and in 1942 there were only twelve democracies left in the world” 
from democracy and either the return to traditional forms of authoritarian rule or 
totalitarianism.  The reversals occurred largely in those countries that ha
new but also, in many cases, the nation was new (
The second “short” wave of democratization began with the victory of the Alli
states in World War II and culminated with “36 countries governed democratically, on
to be followed by a second reverse wave (1960-75) that brought the number of 
democracies back down to 30” (Huntington 1996, p. 3). 
The Third Wave of democratization began in Portugal in 1974 and since then 
“democratic regimes replaced authoritarian ones in approximately thirty countries in 
Europe, Asia, and Latin America” (Huntington 1991, p. 21).  According to Huntington 
(1996, p. 4), several reasons contributed to the timing of the Third Wave such as the 
performance legitimacy of authoritarian regimes in comparison to democratic stat
unprecedented economic growth of the 1960s which expanded the middle class, and the 
transitions of earlier Third Wave states which served to stimulate and provide models for 





a massive third reverse wave.  Thes s on consolidating the institutions 
that con
s.  





93; Owen 1994).  Most scholars do not debate the presence of the democratic 
re 
characterize their political processes and institutions.  Therefore, norms of compromise 
e actors should focu
stitute liberal democracy and thus prevent democratic decay. 
Democratic Peace 
Democracy, a regime characteristic, has not typically been the driving force 
behind theories of international relations.  Rather, international relations theories have 
been consumed with determining states actions and re-actions in an anarchic world. 
However, with the discovery of the relationship that exists between democracy and 
peace, this regime characteristic has lead to a dominant theory of international relation
The democratic pe
atic peace is seen as a liberal challenge to the dominant international relations 
theory of realism. 
The democratic peace theory is a strong, empirically supported finding in the sub
field of international relations.  In fact, “the absence of war between democracie
as close to anything we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations” 
(Levy 1989, p. 88).  There are two main assumptions of the democratic peace.  
Democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with other democracies.  However, they are just as
war prone as other types of regimes with non-democracies (Doyle 1986; Russett 1993; 
Russett 19
peace; rather they differ over whether the normative or institutional explanation is mo
accurate. 
 The normative approach suggests that democracies do not engage in conflict 





and cooperation prevent escalation.  Shared values exist among democracies.  They view 










settle conflict via compromise, bargaining, and founded upon the rule of law. 
 This dissertation will focus on testing the institutional explanation for the 
democratic peace.  The institutional approach explains the restraint of the democratic 
peace as based on institutions, not the values of democracies.  Democracies maintain a
diffusion of power, usually through a system of checks and balances.  Representative 
institutions can block war through the power of the purse.  Leaders are constrained
democracies because the public must bear the cost of war (both economically and 
socially).   International wars require political leaders to mobilize domestic support for 
their policies.  Therefore, public opinion must be supportive of the policy.  In addition
democracies generally have a slower decision-making process, whereas authoritarian 
regimes are less responsive to pu
their decision-making process.   
 Despite the strong empirical findings of the democratic peace, not all s
convinced that it is possible to generalize from the experience of the Western 
democracies.  Realist scholars in particular remain skeptical.  Spiro (1994) suggests that 
the democratic peace is a statistical artifact, indicating the statistical insignificance of the 
absence of democratic wars.  He suggests that this is simply a Cold War phenomenon and
that as the number of democracies grow, the democratic peace will cease to exist.  Fabe
and Gowa (1995) expand upon this style of research by dividing international conflict 
into multiple time periods.  They determine that the democratic peace is only significa





Cold War to the fact that democratic states were forced to ally against a common 
aggressor.  Thompson (1996) suggests that democratic peace theorists have the cau
direction in reverse (or “putting the cart before the horse”) suggesting that it is not 
democracy that brings about peace.  Rather, it is peace that allows for democracies to
form.  Oren (1995) challenges the democratic peace based upon the variation in the 
definitions of democracy.  He suggests that the peace is simply a creation of limited
definitions in order to explain deviant cases.  Finally, Herrman and Kegley (1995) 
attribute the democratic peace phenomenon to political psychology.  They suggest t
cognitive factors are the true explanations.  Democratic leaders identify with other 
democratic leaders as being similar to themselves.  In turn, they project assumptions 











si  and will not engage in conflict because they are part of the “in-group.”   
 Because of the attractions of the democratic peace, its influence has spread 
beyond academicians to politicians and policy-makers.  Politicians believe that war is not
yet obsolete, but it is on its way to becoming so with the growing number of democratic
states.  More specifically, the optimism of the international community is based on the 
following logic: “the number of democracies in the world has increased rapidly in recent 
years and democracies do not fight one another; therefore, we can look forward to a much
more peaceful world with international relations characterized by cooperation instead of 
conflict” (Sorensen 1998, p. 95).  However, what the international community has failed 
to realize is that the majority of states that have recently taken steps to democratize 
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, professional media, followed by free elections,” 
ese newly democratizing states m
both internally and externally, than any other type of regime. 
Democratization and Conflict 
 It can be argued that Snyder and Mansfield have provided a third contradictory 
assumption to the democratic peace.  It is such a compelling finding that it sho
the international community to reevaluate their policies concerning demo
international community should be very precise in promoting mature, liberal, 
consolidated democracy and
pseudodemocracy, authoritarian democracy, electoral democracy, etc., that may deliver 
the least desired outcomes. 
 Snyder and Mansfield have conducted research which indicates that sta
the transition to democracy, known as anocracies, are more war prone, both internally 
and externally, than either democratic or authoritarian regimes.  Specifically, 
“democratizing states were, on average, about 60 percent more likely to go to war than 
states that were not democratizing” (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, p. 13).  In addition, the
will engage in conflict with either democracies or non-democracies (1995; 1995; 2
Snyder 2000).  Mansfield and Snyder indicate that democratizing states will emphas
diversionary tactics by accentuating foreign threats and highlighting nationalism.  
However, these rocky transitions surrounding democratizing states can be avoided, 
according to Snyder, if “leaders are willing to adopt a strategy of institution-building
before embarking on democratization.  The gradual development of the rule of law, an 





should be able to create a transitional democracy which does not succumb to nationalis
fervor and conflict (2000, p. 41). 
 Critics of the democratization and war literature have reevaluated the research 
conducted by Mansfield and Snyder.  These critics have concluded that the process of 
democratization is not as inherently dangerous as previously suggested by Mansfield a
Snyder.  Enterline performs what he calls a more “straightforward research design” to 
determine that “democratizing states are not more likely, on average, to participate in 
interstate war than are states not undergoing a political transformation” (1996, p. 191). 
He indicates that war involvement does not increase with the process of democratizatio
rather it is more closely affiliated with autocratizing states.  Gleditsch and Ward agree 
with Enterline’s assessment that the “risks of war are reduced by democratization a
exacerbated by reversals in the democratization process” (1997, p. 51).  Mansfield and 
Snyder (2002) have responded to these criticisms with further empirical evidence 










re, an effort must be made to 
on to the argument which suggests that democratic transitions that occur rapidly
are less likely to produce war involvement. 
Because evidence of the democratic peace exists, international pressure forces 
states to begin the process of democratization.  However, as Snyder and Mansfield have 
demonstrated, this transition period is concerning.  Anocracies, which it can be a
are pseudodemocracies, are unstable and violent, and states often become entrenched
this category.  Anocracies undermine the democratic peace and its principles of 











n inhibiting it” (1992, p. 328).  This finding is 
based u d 
e the proce
prevent states from becoming entrenched anocracies. 
Conflict 
 A possible consequence of the democratization process is the heightened chance 
that democratizing states will become more war prone, both internally and externally
This relatively recent discovery by Mansfield and Snyder adds to an area of internationa
relations literature that has long been trying to identify the characteristics that ca
conflict.  Most research in this area is conducted using the interstate dyad as the un
analysis.  Although the interstate dyad is not the proper unit of analysis for this 
dissertation, the predictors of conflict identified within the literature are relevant. 
 A well-established predictor of conflict between states is the presence of a 
contiguous relationship.  States that share a common border, whether by land or by sea, 
are more likely to experience a conflict of interest that can lead directly to interstate 
friction, increase tensions, and enhance the likelihood for war.  Contradictory information 
is present within the conflict literature indicating that alliances can either mitigate or 
enhance the likelihood of interstate conflict.  Conventional wisdom asserts that “allies are 
more likely to resolve disputes by means other than war and, therefore, are less li
engage in war with one another” (Bremer 1992, p. 315).  However, in more sophisticated 
empirical analysis, Bremer discovers the “paradoxical proposition that alliances 
encourage war between members rather tha
pon the logic that states engage in alliances to combat a temporary problem an





The presence of power parity is also widely debated in the conflict literature.  
There is evidence to suggest that possessing the preponderance of power will promote 
peace because no state will initiate a conflict against a stronger, more powerful sta
cannot win.  Alternatively, it is argued that equality in power encourages peace between 
states.  Since neither side can be certain of victory, the war will not be initiated.  Brem
finds that possessing a preponderance of the pow
te if it 
er 




e “have nots” are being exploited for markets and resources.  Bremer discovers 
d 
  
istaken as aggressive and may therefore result in war.  Bremer 
find little evidence to support either scenario.  Overall, the conflict literature is valuable 
tes dyad.  It has also been discovered that major powers are more war prone than 
minor powers.  Major powers engage in more active foreign policy because they are 
interested in keeping their major power status. 
Once again there is a contradiction within the conflict literature regarding the r
of economic development and war.  The first argument indicates that more economical
advanced states will conflict with one another as they attempt to gain “markets and 
resources in a largely zero-sum world” (Bremer 1992, p. 317).  The second argument 
suggests that conflict is more likely to occur between the “haves” and the “have nots” 
since th
that conflicts are more likely to occur between economically disadvantaged groups, or 
between the “haves” and the “have-nots,” rather than between economically advance
states. 
 Finally, the conflict literature has identified militarization as a predictor of war.
Two scenarios are possible.  Based upon the logic of deterrence, states that dedicate 
resources to militarization are less likely to be involved in war.  However, increase 
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earch since it has identified predictors or chara
lead to war.   
Political Consolidation and Political Decay 
 If the first important task for states is to establish democracy, the second, and n
less important, task is to sustain democracy.  This is the process known as political 
consolidation.  Although the term political consolidation is somewhat ambiguous, the 
minimal definition is “meant to describe the challenge of making new democracies 
secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immun
against the threat of authoritarian regression, and building dams against eventual ‘reverse 
waves’” (Schedler 1998, p.  90).  Therefore, “consolidation is the process of achieving 
broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and 
mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is better for their society than any other 
realistic alternative they can imagine” (D
consolidation in the simple term of Linz, democracy must be widely accepted and seen as 
the “only game in town” (1990, p. 156). 
 According to Diamond, there are three tasks necessary to consolidate democracy: 
“democratic deepening, political institutionalization, and regime performance” (1999, p
74).  The process of deepening “makes the formal structures of democracy more libera
accountable, representative, and accessible – in essence, more democratic” (Diamond 
1999, p. 74).  Political institutionalization is a move toward routinized, recurrent, and 
predictable patterns of political behavior” (Diamond 1999, p. 74).  It is the process of 
“strengthening the formal representative and governmental structures of democracy





capable, effective, valued, and binding” (Diamond 1999, p. 75).  The final task of 
political consolidation is regime performance.  “Over time and over a succession of









democratic decay “implies a grad fuzzy semidemocracy, to a 
hybrid 7).  
include: a relatively high level of economic development, a relatively low level of 
outputs to build broad political legitimacy or at least to avoid the crystallization of 
substantial pockets of resistance to the regime’s legitimacy” (Diamond 1999, p. 74). 
 If the process of political consolidation does not occur, it is likely to be replace
by democratic breakdown or decay.  Democratic breakdown is essentially the sudden 
death of democracy.  It is the “dramatic, sudden, and visible relapses to authoritarian
rule” (Schedler 1998, p. 97).  This democratic breakdown can be caused by a variety of 
reasons, 
ion, or a disloyal opposition that intends to question or change the regime (Linz 
1978).   
The process of political decay is less dramatic than democratic breakdown, but it 
is no less significant.  “Many new democracies have to contend with the danger of de
of less spectacular, more incremental, and less transparent forms of regression”  
(Schedler 1998, p. 97).  According to Schedler, democratic breakdown “provokes a 
radical discontinuity with democratic politics (leading to open authoritarianism),” while
ual corrosion leading to 
regime somewhere between liberal democracy and dictatorship” (1998, p. 9
Political Development 
Scholars have identified several preconditions of democratization that are 





socioeconomic inequality, and a majority of the population that is literate.  Other sc
also point to
holars 










The first precondition is a relatively high level of economic development. In 1959 
Lipset “highlighted the seeming correlation between high levels of economic 
development and the prevalence of democratic political systems” (Huntington 1984, p. 
198; Przeworski 1996; Curtis 1997; Przeworski 2000; Diamond 1996; Seligson 1987).  
Lipset goes on to suggest that the “more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chance that it 
will sustain democracy” (Huntington 1984, p. 198).  The “evidence is overwhelming t
economic development has a strong positive effect on democratization” (Huntington 
1997, p. 4).  In addition, Seligson (1987) has indicated that an economic threshold effect 
exists before states can make the successful transition to democracy.  Huntington (
p. 4) suggests several reasons that explain the correlation between high economic 
development and the level of democratization.  Economic development involves hi
levels of urbanization, literacy, and education while producing more resources for 
distribution among groups in society.  Economic growth produces a more complex 
economy that becomes increasingly difficult for the state to control.  In addition, the 
easing of state control of the economy leads to the creation and growth of indepen
centers of power.  Finally, Huntington acknowledges that in the short term rapid 
economic growth often exacerbates inco
 equality in income distribution. 
In close association to a relatively high level of economic development is the 





during the initial stages of rapid economic growth inequalities can be exacerbated, t
effect becomes more egalitarian over time.  Simon Kuznets (1955) describe
inverted-U-shaped curve that when an economy is largely agricultural and 
underdeveloped it has a low level of income inequality, then during industrialization 
income inequality increases, and finally at some crucial point income inequality starts to
decrease over time.  Muller (1988) suggests that democracy must be present for at
twenty years before an egalitarian effect starts to occur.  This egalitarian effect is 
necessary because, according to Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, “deep, cumu
his 







other is indirectly, through education’s contribution to higher incomes” 
(1996, 
.  





undemocratic – but constitutional liberalism.  Britain’s legacy of law and 
administration has proved more beneficial… (Zakaria 1997, p. 29). 
 
ities represent a poor foundation for democracy” (1995, p. 24).   
Seligson (1987) suggests that a threshold effect exists regarding the literacy level 
of a democratizing state.  Particularly, fifty-one percent of the population must be literate. 
Essentially, education is a basic requirement for the establishment of democracy.  Rowe
indicates that “there are two ways in which education can influence democracy: one is 
directly, through the effect that an educated citizenry can have on political processes and 
institutions.  The 
p. 311).   
Within the area of cultural theory, two aspects are necessary for democratization
The first is the idea of political learning which is associated w
lonial legacy suggests, according to Myron Weiner,  
every single country in the Third World that emerged from colonial rule since t
Second World War with a population of at least one million (and almost all the 
smaller colonies as well) with a continuous democratic experience is a form





In addition, Przeworski suggests that “democracies are somewhat more likely to survive 
in countries that were British colonies” (2000, p. 126).  Therefore, states that have a 
history as a British colony should produce a positive effect on the level of 
democratization. 
 The second related precondition to cultural theory is the idea that the majority of 
the population should be Protestant.  Weber’s idea of the Protestant ethic states that areas 
that were colonized by Protestant countries had a more likely chance of developing.  
Beliefs and disciplines associated with Protestantism gave these states an advantage over 
Catholics, or other religions, trying to develop.  Lipset suggests “the emphasis within 
Protestantism on individual responsibility furthered the emergence of democratic values” 
(Prezworski 2000, p. 126).  Weber also identified the correlation between Protestantism, 
individualism, and capitalism.  States that embrace individualistic and capitalistic 
attitudes are more likely to develop democracy.  According to these theorists, 
Catholicism, Islam, and Confucianism lack the individual discipline necessary to promote 
democratization.  Therefore, there should be a positive correlation between Protestantism 












Chapter 3 – The Institutional Threshold Theory 
Political Institutions 
 According to Mansfield and Snyder, “the happy outcomes of the democratic 
peace emerge only after a transition to democracy is well consolidated” (2002, p. 300).  
Mature liberal democracies are dependent upon the successful strengthening of 
institutions.  Political institutions are public bodies “with formally designated structures 
and functions, intended to regulate certain defined activities which apply to the whole 
population” (Bealey 1999, p. 166).  They are a system through which power is 
distributed, exercised, and regulated in society.  As Soskice explains, institutions 
“perform a major function for society (which is) to induce stability and consistency in 
collective life” (1992, p. 548).  Thus, institutions “create definite, continuous, and 
organized patterns of behavior by individuals, imparting predictability and regularity to 
the basic activities of human society” (Soskice 1992, p. 548).   
According to Diamond, Linz, and Lipset there are several reasons as to why 
political institutionalizations are “strongly related to the persistence and stability of 
democracy” (1995, p. 33).  The first reasons explains that “institutions structure behavior 
into stable, predictable, and recurrent patterns,” therefore “institutional systems are less 
volatile and more enduring, and so are institutionalized democracies” (1995, p. 33).  
Secondly, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset explain, “democracies that have more coherent and 
effective political institutions will be more likely to perform well politically in 
maintaining not only political order but also a rule of law, thus ensuring civil liberties, 
checking the abuse of power, and providing meaningful representation, competition, 





institutions explains, “well-institutionalized democracies are also more likely to produce 
workable, sustainable, and effective economic and social policies because they have more 
effective and stable structures for representing interests and they are more likely to 
produce working congressional majorities or coalitions that can adopt and sustain 
policies” (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995, p. 33).  Finally, “democracies that have 
capable, coherent democratic institutions are better able to limit military involvement in 
politics and assert civilian control over the military” (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995, p. 
33). 
 Therefore, it has been established that political institutions act “as a key factor 
affecting the viability and stability of democracy” (Diamond, et. al. 1997, p. xxii).  The 
international community will continue to advocate democratization, however policies to 
foster democratic transitions should be accompanied by efforts to mold strong, 
centralized institutions that can withstand the intense demands on the state and political 
elites posed by high-energy mass publics. 
 According to Diamond, Linz, and Lipset “political leadership has been a notable 
and oft-neglected factor in the pursuit of democratic consolidation” (1995, p. 17).  
“Democratically loyal leaders reject the use and rhetoric of violence and illegal or 
unconstitutional means for the pursuit of power, and they refuse to condone or tolerate 
antidemocratic actions by other participants” (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995, p. 16).  
Although political leadership often influences the fate of democratic transitions, it is not 
the only important factor concerning the executive.  Equally important are executives that 





 Often in new and unconsolidated democracies, legislative and judicial branches 
are weak or non-existent in relation to an exalted executive.  However, “elected 
legislatures (at all levels of governance) are a crucial institution for the representation of 
interests and horizontal accountability” (Diamond 1999, p. 98).  According to Diamond, 
“if legislatures are to become meaningful forums for injecting the interests and concerns 
of their constituencies into the policy process, they must have sufficiently elaborated and 
resourceful organizational structures so they can engage, challenge, and check executive 
officials and state bureaucracies” (1999, p. 98).  In order for legislatures to serve their 
intended role as a check on the executive branch and an advocate for their constituents, 
they must have the “organization, financial resources, equipment, experienced members, 
and staff to serve as a mature and autonomous” actor (Diamond 1999, p. 98). 
Not only is the legislative branch often a weak actor in democratizing states, the judicial 
systems “are feeble and ineffective, crippled by endemic corruption, intimidation, 
politicization, and lack of resources in training” (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995, p. 41).  
However, it is important to stress the significance of a strong and independent judiciary 
in the democratizing process.  In order to provide for the rule of law, enforce a 
democratic constitution, protect individual and collective rights, constrain and hold 
accountable the elected officials, “the judicial system must have a high degree of 
institutional coherence, capacity, and autonomy” (Diamond 1999, p. 75).   
 In order for a state to consolidate democracy, “a usable bureaucracy” is necessary 
(Linz and Stepan 1997, p. 20).  A usable bureaucracy acts as the “administrative capacity 
to perform the essential functions of government: to maintain order, adjudicate disputes, 





collect the necessary taxes to fund these activities” (Diamond, et.al. 1997, p. xxiii).  The 
bureaucracy also serves as deterrence to political corruption.  States that employ a 
professionalized meritocratic bureaucracy, instead of a civil service based on patronage, 
are more likely to consolidate democracy (Diamond 1999; Diamond, et.al. 1997; 
Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995). 
 The first step a new democracy must take is establishing a de-jure or de-facto 
constitution that provides the guidelines for democratic governance.  Constitutionalism is 
“a complicated system of checks and balances designed to prevent the accumulation of 
power and the abuse of office.  This is done not by simply writing up a list of rights but 
by constructing a system on which government will not violate these rights” (Zakaria 
1997, p. 41).  Constitutions are “also meant to tame the passions of the public, creating 
not simply democratic but deliberative government” (Zakaria, p. 1997 41).   
 A related aspect to the constitutional structure is the decision concerning the 
electoral system choice of parliamentarism versus presidentialism.  Several reasons are 
provided by Diamond, et. al. (1999), Linz (1990); and Prezworski (1996) to explain why 
parliamentary democracy is more viable than presidentialism.  First, “a presidential 
system tends to concentrate power in the executive branch and to facilitate claims to 
plebiscitarian legitimacy” (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995, p. 39).  “Second, 
presidentialism can give rise to a paralyzing deadlock between the executive and the 
legislature” (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995, p. 39).  “The third problem with 
presidentialism is tied to and exacerbated by its majoritarian nature, which tends to make 
politics a zero-sum game in which power sharing is difficult and legislative coalitions are 





Finally, “presidentialism, with its fixed terms, rigidifies outcomes, possibly sticking a 
nation – even for several years – with a government that has utterly lost public 
confidence and support” (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995, p. 40).   
 Another concern for new democracies in the consolidation process is the 
establishment of political parties.  According to Diamond, political parties are “an 
indispensable institutional framework for representation and governance in a democracy” 
(1999, p. 96).  Mainwaring suggests, “in an institutionalized party system, there is 
stability in who the main parties are and in how they behave” (1998, p. 68).  Mainwaring 
also provides four dimensions of party institutionalization: more institutionalized party 
systems enjoy considerable stability; more institutionalized systems are ones in which 
parties have strong roots in society; in more institutionalized systems, the major political 
actors accord legitimacy to parties; and finally, in more institutionalized systems, party 
organization matters (1998, pp. 68-69).  Without effective political parties that provide a 
voice for citizens and opposition, and can govern effectively, the successful democratic 
consolidation becomes less certain. 
 In addition to legitimizing the above institutions, “democracy cannot be 
consolidated until the military becomes firmly subordinated to civilian control and solidly 
committed to the democratic constitutional order” (Diamond, et. al.1997, p. xxvii; Dahl, 
1989).  “When the military as an institution has a long tradition of political intervention 
and retains extensive political and economic prerogatives, new democracies face a 
particularly difficult and dangerous challenge” (Diamond 1999, p. 113).  Therefore, “the 





and refocus the military’s mission, training, and expenditures around issues of external 
security” (Diamond 1999, p. 113). 
 Press freedom is also a necessary element to democratic consolidation.  Van Belle 
has demonstrated that a “high degree of correlation” exists “between press freedom and 
democracy” (2000, p. 51).  Press freedom is necessary to provide for an arena of political 
competition.  In authoritarian states and pseudodemocracies, the press is restricted and 
controlled by the government and it is therefore unable to serve as an arena of political 
competition or debate. 
 The final institutional area that must be renovated for democratic consolidation 
concerns the free and fair elections of political officials.  As Huntington suggests 
“selecting rulers through elections is the heart of democracy” (1991, p. 267).  However, 
as this research has tried to demonstrate, it is not enough to declare success with electoral 
democracies, rather this is a minimalist definition of democracy.  With that said, the 
process of selecting leaders through free and fair elections is fundamental to 
democratization. 
“Freedom entails the right and the opportunity to choose one thing over another” 
and “fairness means impartiality” (Elklit and Svensson 1997, p. 35).  “If a country holds 
competitive, multiparty elections, we call it democratic.  When public participation is 
increased, for example through the enfranchisement of women, it is seen as more 
democratic” (Zakaria 1997, p. 25).  Therefore, competitive elections are necessary for 





In “Why Elections Matter,” Elizabeth Spiro Clark presents a summary of the 
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) minimum electoral 
standards.  Suggested by these minimum standards are five criteria: 
• elections will be held under universal and equal suffrage at reasonable 
intervals, as established by law, for, at a minimum, all seats in one 
chamber of the legislature; 
• the executive must be accountable either directly to the electorate or to 
elected legislators; 
• there must be a clear separation between parties and state; 
• individuals have the right to stand for office, organize themselves in 
political parties, obtain information, and access to the media unimpeded 
by intimidation to administrative obstacles on a basis of equal treatment 
before the law and by the authorities, and to serve out their terms of office; 
and  
• votes are to be cast by secret ballot, or equivalent, and honestly counted, 
reported and made public (Clark 2000, p. 30). 
 
Governmental versus Intermediary Institutions 
 
 Political institutions are imperative to democratic societies because they structure 
behavior in predictable and regular fashions.  As a result, they provide for democratic 
consolidation and long-term stability by making the “government authorities accountable 
to the average voter” (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, p. 51).  This dissertation distinguishes 
the broad category of political institutions into two smaller categories called 
governmental and intermediary institutions.   
Governmental institutions are the formal institutions that create the government 
itself.  They hold the real decision-making powers of the government.  Examples of 
governmental institutions are the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the 
constitution, which explains the divisions of these formal powers, and the military, which 





Alternatively, intermediary institutions serve “to link citizens to their 
government” (Pharr 2000, p. 14), “aggregate and channel social demands within the 
political arena” (Roberts 1996, p. 113), and “represent citizens to and in the state” 
(Jensen and Phillips 1996, p. 118).  In other words, intermediary institutions serve as the 
liaison or conduit between the citizens and the state.  These are the mechanisms that 
allow the government to reach the citizens and allow the citizens to reach the 
government.  Examples of intermediary institutions are political parties, the press, 
elections, and the bureaucracy. 
The Institutional Threshold Theory 
 
 The recent pressure to democratize that has been levied upon states from the 
international community has its origins in the peace, security, and cooperative 
implications of the democratic peace.  The democratic peace views the proliferation of 
democracy as a constructive force in world politics, yet the democratization process only 
serves to aggravate the hostilities intrinsic in international relations.  The institutional 
threshold theory is an attempt to reconcile the optimism of the democratic peace with the 
pessimistic standpoint of the democratization and war literature by discovering the 
political institutions that serve as the “lynch pins” of democratic consolidation and by 
extension the prevention of armed conflict.  By reducing the amount of time states spend 
in the democratizing process, the inherently dangerous and disruptive behavior that 
accompanies democratization can be mitigated, therefore leading to a reduction in the 
conflict levels of democratizing states. 
The institutional threshold theory suggests that there are necessary and sufficient 





must pass through this institutional threshold, which means that the majority of the 
following institutions must be strengthened: the role of the executive must be 
constitutionally constrained and political executives must maintain favorable attitudes 
towards democracy; the legislative branch must act as a check on executive officials and 
have the ability to advocate for their constituents; the judicial system must act as an 
independent actor that can guarantee the rule of law; a meritorious bureaucracy must be 
established; a constitution must be in place that prevents the accumulation of power and 
abuses of office through a system of checks and balances; opposition political parties 
must be allowed to form; the military must hold a subordinate role to elected officials; 
freedom of the press is necessary to provide for an open debate arena; and elected 
officials must be selected through free and fair elections.   
The institutional threshold theory does not act as a prerequisite for democracy 
“with adjectives” because in most democratizing states a pseudodemocracy, authoritarian 
democracy, electoral democracy, etc. has already been established.  The theory does, 
however, act as the primary function necessary for democratic consolidation to occur and 
a mature democracy to develop. 
There are two alternative scenarios or paths that countries can travel according to 
the institutional threshold theory.  As Figure 3-1 shows, the first scenario suggests that 
countries become anocracies, which indicates a hybrid regime consisting of both 
authoritarian and democratic traits.  States then progress towards democratization, 
indicating that they have become new or transitional democracies, yet they do not possess 
viable political institutions that authenticate the democratic peace.  Those states that 





majority of their institutions, will then consolidate democracy and validate the democratic 
peace and the passivity that exists between liberal institutionalized democracies.  In this 
scenario, the inherent dangers of the democratizing process have been mitigated because 
political institutions have been strengthened and therefore provide mechanisms that 
channel and regulate behaviors of the elites and masses alike.  Political elites no longer 
must resort to the promotion of diversionary tactics, emphasize foreign threats, or endorse 
nationalist rhetoric.  Rather, the regime reforms provided by the institutions allow for the 
accommodation of political opposition groups and social cleavages that exist in all 
societies. 
The alternative scenario applies to those states that do not pass through the 
institutional threshold.  These states have not strengthened a majority of the necessary 
and sufficient political institutions, are therefore unable to consolidate democracy, and 
are at risk for becoming an entrenched anocracy.  This lack of democratic consolidation 
suggests that states are still at risk for heightened conflict that exists for democratizing 
states.  Instead of focusing on regime reforms and strengthening their political 
institutions, these states are still susceptible to diversionary tactics and nationalist fervor 
that leads to both internal and external conflict because there are not political institutions 










Figure 3-1. The Institutional Threshold Theory 
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Chapter 4 – Research Design 
 
Introduction 
 The fundamental objectives of this dissertation are to quantitatively test the 
institutional threshold theory outlined in Chapter Three and to identify the political 
institutions that create mature democracies, which are not subject to armed conflict, and 
in turn validate the democratic peace.  In order to assess the institutional threshold theory, 
answer the research questions, and test the related hypotheses, three quantitative chapters 
are necessary.  Chapter Five examines the relationship between political institutions and 
the level of democratization.  Chapter Six and Seven examine the relationship between 
political institutions and armed conflict.  Chapter Six focuses on the Militarized Interstate 
Dispute data set as the measure of conflict, which remains consistent with previous 
research.  Chapter Seven employs the Armed Conflict data set, which expands upon the 
limitations of previous research. 
 Considering that the states of interest in this dissertation research are anocracies, 
which are at worst underdeveloped and at best developing, many of the variables are 
limited.  Several variables do not cover the entire time span of interest (1974 through 
2000) and some variables do not cover all states of interest.  As a result of the variable 
limitations, four data sets, which employ different time frames, states, and variables, are 
included.  Descriptions of the four datasets are as follows4: 
 1974 through 2000 – This dataset covers the entire time span of interest, however, 
it includes a subset of countries.  Seventy states are analyzed in this dataset. 
 Entered System Late – This data set includes all states of interest in the research 
which is a total of eighty-seven.  It incorporates states that entered the system 
                                                 





after 1974, such as Namibia, Mozambique, and those states that gained 
independence as a result of the Soviet Union collapse.  It covers the years 1991 
through 2000. 
 Rule of Law / Bureaucratic Quality – The data set incorporates the rule of law and 
bureaucratic quality component variables in the institutional index.  However, this 
data could only be collected for sixty-two states covering the years 1982 through 
1997. 
 Regime Change – The final data set includes a regime change control variable.  
Once again, the data does not exist for all states of interest.  Sixty-two states are 
analyzed covering the years 1974 through 1992. 
Although it is less than ideal to use four different data sets, since it makes 
comparisons across years and states more difficult, it is necessary because of the 
limitations of the variables.  The use of the four data sets allows for all possible scenarios 
to be analyzed including the maximum number of years, countries of interest, and various 
dependent, independent, and control variables. 
Questions and Hypotheses 
 In an effort to understand the reasons why some states are able to consolidate 
democracy and then enjoy the pacificity that exists among democratic states, several 
research questions and hypothesis have been developed.  Is democracy promotion a 
valuable policy tool to ensure world peace, or are the policy-makers inadvertently 
advancing conflict as suggested by Mansfield and Snyder?   Which political institutions 
are necessary to ensure democratic consolidation and by extension prevent armed conflict 





governmental institutions and intermediary institutions in democratic consolidation and 
the prevention of armed conflict?  Similar to the threshold that exists for the gross 
national product and literacy rates, is there an institutional threshold necessary for states 
to democratize?  In order to answer these questions, the following hypotheses were 
generated: 
H1. States that are making the transition to democracy while establishing strong 
political institutions, as evidenced by a higher institutional index score, are more 
likely to consolidate democracy. 
 
H2. States that are making the transition to democracy while establishing strong 
political institutions, as evidenced by a higher institutional index score, are less 
likely to be involved in armed conflict. 
 
To appropriately test the institutional threshold theory, two stages of analysis are 
necessary.  The first stage of analysis examines the relationship between political 
institutions and the level of democratization.  The second stage analyzes the relationship 
between political institutions, the level of democratization, and their combined impact on 
conflict.  Hypothesis 1 is tested in Chapter 5 and Hypothesis 2 is tested in Chapters 6 and 
7.  A two-stage analysis is necessary because political institutions are critical to 
democratic consolidation.  Institutions must be strengthened before democratic 
consolidation can occur.  Only when states consolidate democracy do they meet the 
conditions of the democratic peace and the passivity that exists between its members. 
H3. Governmental institutions have a greater positive influence on democratic 
consolidation than intermediary institutions. 
 
 This dissertation differentiates between governmental and intermediary 
institutions.  Governmental institutions are the organizations that hold the formal powers 
of the government.  Intermediary institutions are those that link the citizens to the 





and the governmental institutions.  Although both governmental and intermediary 
institutions are necessary to democratic consolidation, this hypothesis suggests that 
governmental institutions must first be strengthened before intermediary institutions can 
serve their function as a linking mechanism between the government and the citizens.  
The variable categorization is listed in Figure 4-1.   
Figure 4-1. Classification of Governmental and Intermediary Institutions 
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS 
Openness of Executive Recruitment Party Legitimacy 
Constraints on the Chief Executive Bureaucratic Quality 
Legislative Effectiveness Press Freedom 
Legislative Selection Free and Fair Elections 
Constitutional Checks Universal Suffrage 
Rule of Law  
Military  
Electoral System  
 
Of the thirteen component variables that are included in the institutional index, 
five are considered intermediary institutions.  They are regarded as such because they 
serve as a liaison between the citizens and the government.  The remaining eight 
institutions are considered to be governmental institutions since they hold more formal 
powers.  Each component variable of the institutional index is tested for its impact on the 
level of democratization and conflict.   
Methodology 
  
 In order to assess the significance of the institutional threshold theory and the 
related hypotheses, two research methodologies are employed in three quantitative 
chapters.  Through the use of a time-series panel regression, Chapter 5 examines the 
relationship between political institutions and the level of democratization.  Chapter 6 





institutions, and the level of democratization.  A time series panel logit is used to 
examine the relationship.  Finally, Chapter 7 assesses the impact of the Armed Conflict 
data set, political institutions, and the level of democratization through the use of a time 
series panel regression. 
Explanation of Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 is the first stage of the two-stage analysis necessary to test the 
relationship between political institutions, the level of democratization, and conflict.  This 
chapter tests the impact that political institutions have on the level of democratization.  It 
does so for the four different data sets.  A time series panel regression, also called a 
cross-sectional time series regression, is used to analyze the theory and related 
hypotheses.  This type of analysis deals with two-dimensional panel data.  The data is 
collected over time and states and then a regression model is performed on these two 
dimensions.  Time series panel regression allows for models to be estimated using the 
fixed or random effects command.  According to the Data and Statistical Services 
through the Princeton University Library, “fixed effects regression is the model to use 
when you want to control for omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant 
over time” (http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/panel.htm).  Fixed effects 
regression “is equivalent to generating dummy variables for each of your cases and 
including them in a standard linear regression to control for these fixed ‘case effects’” 
(http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/panel.htm).  The random effects regression 
is best used “if you have reason to believe that some omitted variables may be constant 





time, then you can include both types by using random effects” 
(http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/panel.htm).   
The Hausman specification test is used to determine whether the data is best 
suited to be estimated using the fixed or random effects command.  The Hausman test 
was performed upon the various models.  The test produced mixed results meaning that 
some of the models were best estimated using random effects regression, whereas other 
models were best estimated using fixed effects regression.  Since it is not possible to 
compare fixed effects and random effects models equivalently, it was decided to use the 
random effects regression models because this allows for the estimation of a dichotomous 
independent variable5.  The fixed effects models does not allow for estimation of any 
dichotomous independent variables. 
For each of the four data sets (1974-2000, Entered System Late, Rule of 
Law/Bureaucratic Quality, and Regime Change), various models are estimated.  Model 1 
explains the equation for testing the significance of the institutional index.  Model 2 tests 
the significance of the component variables of the institutional index on the level of 
democratization.  Models 3 and 4 replicate Models 1 and 2, but with the addition of 
regime change as a control variable. 
Figure 4-2: Formulas for Time Series Panel Regression Models in Chapter 5 
Model 1: µββββββ +−++++= MARRELIGIONCOLLEGLITERACYGNPpcINDEXDEMY 654321  










                                                 
5 Both random effects and fixed effect regression tests were performed for the various models.  There 
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 The models in Chapter Five have a problem with collinearity since ther
component variables that are used in both the dependent variable, the level of 
democratization indicator, and the institutional index, which is one of the independent 
variables.  To account for this problem, statistical analyses are performed on two other
dependent variables – the F
Explanation of Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 employs a time series panel logit that utilizes a combination of the fix
and random effects estimation techniques, in order to test the statistical significance of 
the theory and hypotheses proposed earlier.  The logit model allows for the estimation
a dichotomous dependent variable, which in this case is the presence or absence of a 
states involvement in a militarized interstate dispute (MID). To predict the probabil
ye−+1
Where Y=1 if the state was involved in a MID and 0 if the state was not involved in a 
MID for the given yea
1  
r.  The models assume that Y is linearly related to the variables 
shown in
ulas for Time Series Panel Logit Models in Chapter 6 
 Figure 4-3. 
Figure 4-3: Form
µββββββ +++++−= ALLYCONTCAPMARINDEXPOLITYMIDY 6543221  Model 1: 

























instance is the presence of a MID reater than .5 assume that a 
ID.  
combi  
ed Conflict data set which includes external and internal conflicts. 
ure 4-4: Formulas for Time Series Panel Regression Models in Chapter 7 
e exception of the intercept, all parameters are signed to be consistent with 
hypothesized effects. 
The logit model allows for the generation of probabilities which indicate whethe
the model accurately predicts the outcome of the dependent variable, which in this 
.  Predicted probabilities g
MID is present, whereas probabilities less than .499 suggest the absence of a M
Explanation of Chapter 7 
 Chapter 7 once again uses a time series panel regression, employing a 
combination of the fixed and random effects estimation techniques, to test the 
relationship between political institutions, the level of democratization, and their 
ned effect on armed conflict.  This chapter expands upon previous research by
using the Arm
Fig
µββββββ +++++−= ALLYCONTCAPMARINDEXPOLITYModel 1: CONFLICTY 6543221  





















 In the Polity IV data set, Marshall and Jaggers (2000) define coherent 
democracies as those states which receive a regime type, or polity score, greater than six, 
coherent autocracies as states whose regime score is less than negative six, and define all 
remaining states as anocracies.  However, they provide little theoretical justification for 
their classification of democracies, autocracies, and anocracies.  The cases were selected 
according to Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore’s definition of anocracies.  Therefore, anocracies 
are defined as those states whose polity s from –6 to +6.  States were included 




he democratic score.  This produces a single regime score 
which ranges from +10 (f  (fully autocratic 
 score range
 were categorized as a
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Level of Democratization 
In order to gauge the level of democratization for the countries of interest, the 
“Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions” dataset is utiliz
Marshall and Jaggers combine annual measures of the competitiveness of executive
recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, 
and competitiveness of political participation to create an eleven-point scale of the 
country’s democratic and autocratic characteristics.  These two indicators are then 
combined to produce a third indicator, the polity score, which is derived by subtracting 
the autocratic score from t





characteristics.  This twenty-one-point polity score indicator is used to operationaliz
level of democratization. 
Freedom House Democracy Indicator 
 Due to the collinearity problem that exists within Chapter Five between the 
dependent variable, the level of democratization assessed by the Polity2 variable, and th
institutional index, it is necessary to use other dependent variables to be certain that the 
initial results produced are accu
e the 
e 




includes the right to vote and compete for public office and to elect 
include the freedom to develop opinion, institutions, and personal autonomy 
 
emocratic.  The political rights and civil liberties variables are then 
combined to produce the dem tor is a scale 
ranging
in the level of democratization, the Polity2 score is used from the Polity IV Project.  Each 
edom House Democracy Indicator.  The Freedom House data is based upon two 
ies: political rights and civil liberties.  According to the Freedom in the Wor
 Methodology (2003),  
political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process.  This 
representatives who have a decisive vote on public policies.  Civil liberties 
without interference from the state. 
These two broad categories are assessed on a seven-point scale ranging from the 
most to the least d
ocracy indicator.  This democracy indica
 from one to fourteen, with one being the least democratic and fourteen being the 
most democratic. 
Change in the Level of Democratization 
Due to contamination, the second alternative dependent variable is the change in 
the level of democratization.  This dependent variable is used to see if the political 





state’s twenty-one point polity score indicator is subtracted from the previous years 
This number indicates the state’s change in the lev
score.  
el of democratization from one year to 





 a state was involved in any type of militarized interstate dispute, it is 




lict Dataset, previous research can 
res changes in the positive (dem
s in the negative (authoritarian) direction. 
Militarized Interstate Disputes 
The first model to be tested remains consistent with previous research.  The m
employs the Correlates of War (COW) Project Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) 
dataset as the dependent variable.  The dataset’s definition of a militarized interstate 
dispute “refers to historical cases in which the threat, display, or use of military force by 
one member state is explicitly directed t owards the government, official representatives
official forces, property, or territory of another state” (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1
168).  Based upon the MID dataset, a dichotomous variable called MID involvement is 
constructed based upon the hostility level.  Hostility levels range from the lack of 
militarized action, the threat to use force, the display of force, the use of force, and at the 
extreme, war.  If
ot involved in a militariz
 of zero. 
Armed Conflict Dataset 
Although previous research has used the Correlates of War (COW) Militari
Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, this chapter employs the  “Armed Conflict Dataset 
1946-2001,” which was compiled by Nils Peter Gleditsch, et al. (2002).  Previous 
research has limited the analyses by using a logit model and only applying the analysi








overnment whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally 
le-
 occurred over the conflict history.  A three specifies a war which is 
operationalized as more than 1,00 er year for every year of the 
conflicts history.   
such a 
large number of independent variables, due to the reduction in the available degrees of 
nded upon through the use of a time series panel regression and applying the 
analysis to external as well as internal conflict. 
The dataset’s definition of armed conflict is “a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force betwee
parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.  Of these two parties, at least one is th
government of a state” (Gleditsch 2002, p. 618-19).  A state is defined as “an 
internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory, or a 
non-recognized g
recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory” (Gleditsch 
2002, p. 619).   
 The dependent variable measures the intensity level of conflict which was coded 
along four categories.  A zero indicates the lack of conflict.  A one signifies a minor 
conflict which indicates that more than 25 battle-related deaths have occurred for every 
year in the period.  A two designates an intermediate conflict.  This suggests that more 
than 25 battle-related deaths have occurred per year and a total of more than 1,000 batt
related deaths have
0 battle-related deaths p
Independent Variables 
Institutional Index 
 There are a total of thirteen independent variables which measure the different 





freedom, the measures for the political institutions have been aggregated into an 
institutional index.  All thirteen variables have been recoded on a common scale.6  A zero
to twelve-point scale is used for each variable, which is necessary so that one variable is 
not weighed more than another in the institutional index.  Higher index scores indicate a 
greater level of institutionalization, whereas low
 
er scores suggest a more elementary level 
of institutional devel
Component Variables of the Institutional Index 
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opment. 
Executives 
 In order to ascertain the role of the executive, two variables are utilized from the 
Polity IV dataset.  These variables include the o
straints placed on the chief executive.   
First, the openness of the executive recruitment determines the extent to which 
“all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the positio
through a regularized process” (Marshall and Jaggers 2000, p. 19).  Four categories a
used to operationalize this variable.  A one indicates a closed system in which chief 
executives are determined through hereditary succession.  A two signifies regimes that 
maintain a dual executive, in which a hereditary ruler shares power with an appointed 
governing minister.  A three denotes a dual executive system in which power is shared by 
a hereditary ruler in addition to an elected governing minister.  Regimes are coded as four 
if they are categorized as having an open system of recruitment, regardle
executive is elected or selected through some other regularized process. 
 Secondly, a seven-point scale is used to determine the “institutionalized 
constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive” (Marshall and Jaggers
 





2000, p. 21).  Regimes receive a score of one or two (the intermediate category) if th
support executives that have unlimited authority.  A three or four (the intermediate
category) indicates regimes that place slight to moderate limitations on executive 
authority.  Regimes that place substantial limitations on executive authority are coded as 
a five or six (the intermediate category).  Finally, a seven indicates regimes in
ey 
 
 which the 









 Two variables from the Cross National Time Series Dataset are used to 
operationalize the role of the legislative branch.  The first variable refers to legislative 
effectiveness and is categorized on a four-point scale.  A zero indicates that a legislatu
does not exist.  A one represents an ineffective legislature.  “There are three possible 
bases for this coding: first, legislative activity may be essentially of a ‘rubber stam
character; second, domestic turmoil may make the implementation of legislation 
impossible; third, the effective executive may prevent the legislature from meeting, or
otherwise substantially impede the exercise of its functions” (Banks, CNTS).  A two 
indicates that the legislature is partially effective.  This is a situation in which the power 
of the executive outweighs the legislative branch, but does not completely dominate the 
legislature.  Finally, an effective legislature receives a three.  An effective legislature is 
characterized by “the possession of significant governmental autonomy by the legislature,
including, typically, substantial authority in regard to taxation and d
to override executive vetoes of legislation” (Banks, CNTS). 
The second variable refers to the method of legislative selection.  A zero once 





“Examples would be the selection of legislators by the effective executive, or by mea
of heredity or ascription” (Banks, CNTS).  A two designates an elective legislature.  
Elective legislatures “(or members of the lower house in a bicameral sys
ns 
tem) are selected 
by means of either direct or indirect popular election” (Banks, CNTS). 
 make 
  The data for the rule of law variable is 




he bureaucratic quality variable is only 
available for the years 1982 throu
Judiciary 
 The judiciary is measured through a rule of law variable which is collected from 
Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer’s IRIS III dataset.  Rule of law reflects “the degree to 
which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to
and implement laws and adjudicate disputes”  (Knack, IRIS III).  The variable is 
operationalized on a zero to six-point scale.  Higher scores indicate “sound political 
institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power” 
(Knack, IRIS III).  Lower scores designate “a tradition of depending on physical force or 
illegal means to settle claims” (Knack, IRIS III).
gh 1997. 
Bureaucracy 
 Bureaucratic quality is measured on a zero to six-point scale which is attained fr
the IRIS III dataset.  Higher scores are symbolic of “an established mechanism for 
recruitment and training, autonomy from political pressure, and strength and exper
govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services” 
(Knack, IRIS III).  Higher scores represent a more professionalized and meritorious 
bureaucracy.  Lower scores indicate the lack of a professional bureaucracy and one 







 Constitutional checks, which is attained from the Database of Political Insti
an indirect measure of a state’s constitutional checks and balances.7  This is an 
incremental number with higher numbers indicating the more checks that are in place.  
The  measure accounts for checks that are placed on the exe
tutions, is 
cutive and legislative 
branches, as well as the role of oppos ties. 
 
litical parties do not exist, or all but the 
“one 
rticipation.  This measure was 
collected from the Cross National Tim
one 
ilian, 
 control.  This information was collected 
from the Cross National Time Series Data. 
                                                
ition political par
Political Parties 
 In order to operationalize the role of political parties, a variable measuring party
legitimacy is used.  A zero indicates that po
dominant party is excluded from political 
 participation.  A one represents significant exclusion of parties.  A two denotes that 
or more minor or ‘extremist’ parties are excluded” (Banks, CNTS).  Finally, a three 
suggests that no political parties are excluded from pa
e Series Data. 
Regime Type 
 A three-point scale is used to operationalize the role of the military in politics.  A 
denotes a civilian government in which the military plays a subordinate role.  A two 
signifies a military-civilian government in which the government is outwardly civ
but effectively controlled by a military elite.  Finally, a three indicates a military 
government in which there is direct military
 
 
7 Constitutional checks is the only independent variable that is not recoded for use in the institutional index 






 Two different datasets are used to measure the level of press freedom.  First, 
Douglas Van Belle compiled a comprehensive dataset which measures global press 
freedom.  The data covers an extended time frame for all of the states in the Polity III 





ggests that the press is directly controlled by the government or strictly 
ess.  
reedom House data was collapsed according to the 
five levels of the Van Belle dataset.8   
                                                
years 1974 through 1995.  
 Van Belle operationalizes press freedom according to five different categories.  A
zero indicates that the press is nonexistent or the information is too little to code.  A one 
signifies that the press is free, meaning that the press is capable of operating as an arena 
of political competition.  A two represents an imperfectly free press.  This means that 
freedom of the press is somewhat compromised, yet it can still operate as an arena of 
political competition.  A three indicates that the press is restricted, which suggests that 
the press is not under direct government control, however it is not capable of functionin
as an arena of political debate.  Finally, a four represents a controlled press.  This fi
category su
censored. 
 For the final years of interest, press freedom data is collected from Freedom 
House.  Freedom House uses a 100-point scale to measure press freedom.  The data is 
operationalized according to three categories.  First, a zero to thirty indicates a free pr
Second, a thirty-one to sixty signifies a partly free press.  Finally, a sixty-one to 100 
indicates a press that is not free.  The F
 
8 The Freedom House data was collapsed to merge with the Van Belle data according to the following 





 Although it is never ideal to combine two data sets that have slightly different 
coding rules, their merger allows for the inclusion and estimation of press freedom for the 
entire time frame of interest to this dissertation. 
Electoral System 
The information regarding the type of electoral system is collected from the 
“Database of Political Institutions.”  A trichotomous variable delineates the type of 
system.  A zero indicates that the system has an un-elected executive.  A zero also 
denotes a presidential system in which the chief executive is either directly elected or 
elected by an electoral college.9  A one represents a presidential system where an 
assembly elects the chief executive.  Finally, a two denotes a parliamentary system. 
Free and Fair Elections 
A dichotomous variable, constructed from Polity IV’s competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, is used to measure the concept of free and fair elections.  If states 
are coded as participating in competitive elections, they are assigned the score or one.  
Those states that do not participate in competitive elections receive a score of zero.  
Competitive elections are deemed to be free and fair by independent observers, elections 
outcomes are not predisposed, opposition parties are allowed to compete in the process, 
and the election is free from repression.  If the chief executive is indirectly selected, then 
the electoral body must be freely elected. 
 
 
                                                 
9 According to this variable in the Database of Political Institutions, both un-elected executives and 
presidential systems are coded as a one.  However, through the examination of another variable (the 
Executive Index of Political competitiveness) it is possible to differentiate which systems maintain an un-
elected executive and which systems are presidential.  This is accounted for in the recoding scheme for the 






A dichotomous variable operationalizing universal suffrage is colleted from the 
Europa World Year Book.  Universal suffrage suggests that any citizen over the age of 18 
cannot be denied the right to vote.  A zero indicates that suffrage is not extended to all 
groups.  A one indicates that suffrage is extended to all segments of the citizenry. 
Control Variables 
Gross National Product (per capita) 
 Gross national product, the broadest measure of national income, was derived 
from the World Development Report’s World Development Indicators.10  Gross national 
product is the sum of two components – the gross domestic product and net income from 
abroad. GDP measures the final output of goods and services produced by the domestic 
economy. Net income from abroad is income in the form of compensation of employees, 
interest on loans, profits, and other factor payments that residents receive from abroad, 
less payments made for labor and capital. Most countries estimate GDP by the production 
method.  This method sums the final outputs of the various sectors of the economy (e.g., 
agriculture, manufacturing, and government services), from which the values of the 
inputs to production have been subtracted.  GNP estimates in U.S. dollars are calculated 
according to The World Bank Atlas methodology. GNP estimates in local currencies 
were converted to U.S. dollars using a three-year average exchange rate, adjusted for 
domestic and U.S. inflation. The Atlas method of averaging three years of exchange rates 
smoothes fluctuations due to the currency market and provides a more reliable measure, 
over time, of overall income than do estimates based on a single year’s exchange rate.  
                                                 
10 The World Development Report was not published in 1996 and 1998.  Therefore, the data from the 





Per capita estimates of gross national product are calculated using mid-year population 
data. 
Literacy 
 The data for the literacy rate estimate is attained from the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s Institute for Statistics.  The literacy 
rate refers to the adult aged population (aged 15 and older) who can both read and 
write.11   
Colonial Legacy 
 Colonial legacy is measured as a dichotomous variable.  If the state is a former 
British colony, it is coded as a one.  Otherwise, the state receives a value of zero.  This 
information is attained from the Europa World Year Book. 
Religion 
 Religion is measured as a dichotomous variable that is assessing whether a 
majority of the state’s citizens are followers of a Protestant religion.  If the state is 
predominately Protestant, it was coded as a one.  If the state predominately practiced any 
other type of religion, it received a score of zero.  This information is collected from the 
Europa World Year Book. 
Regime Change  
 The data on regime change was collected from a dataset compiled by Joe Hagan 
for the article titled “Domestic political regime changes and Third World voting 
                                                 
11 The data provided by UNESCO is only an estimate of literacy rates.  In addition, the data is provided at 





realignments in the United Nations.”12  This comprehensive dataset explains regime 
change “as a change occurring in the central leadership body” (Hagan 1989 508).  Using 
a five-point classification scheme which ranges from mild to dramatic changes, Hagan 
produces a more detailed assessment of the severity of regime changes. 
 A one identifies “a change in the effective head of state, but it does not alter the 
regime’s basic political makeup in terms of its component factions or parties” (Hagan 
1989 508).  A two signifies that “there is a change in the leadership body in terms of its 
component factions (in the case of fragmented single-party regimes) or in terms of parties 
or other autonomous political groups (in the case of coalitions)” (Hagan 1989 508).  A 
three designates a regime change characterized by “a replacement of the entire ruling 
group or coalition by another group from the same end of the established political 
spectrum” (Hagan 1989 508).  A four designates a more severe regime change in which 
“there is a replacement of the entire ruling group or coalition by another group from the 
opposite end of the established political spectrum” (Hagan 1989 508).  Finally, a five 
signifies the most dramatic regime change which is characterized by “a revolutionary 
transformation in which a group is replaced by an ‘antisystem’ group that fundamentally 





                                                 
12 The data provided by Joe Hagan was only available through the year 1985.  Wituski provided more 
recent data, using the same coding rules for regime change.  This newer version of the data covers the years 






Conflict Control Variables13 
 It is necessary to employ conflict control variables to account for a state reacting 
to both internal and external events that may cause conflict, such as the number of 
minority at risk groups that are located within the state, state capabilities, the number  
of contiguous relationships, and alliance memberships.  These are traditional conflict 
control variables that can cause any state to become involved in conflict situations; 
however, these impacts can be intensified for states that are involved in the 
democratization process.   
Minorities at Risk 
 The number of minority groups at risk was collected from the Minorities at Risk 
Project dataset, which was compiled by the Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management at the University of Maryland.  The Minorities at Risk Project is a 
detailed, empirical study of ethno-political groups around the globe.  Minority groups 
were included in the dissertation dataset if they meet at least one of the four following 
criteria – the minority group is subject to political, economic, or social discrimination, the 
group is disadvantaged from previous discrimination, an advantaged minority group 
being challenged, or the minority group supports political organizations advocating 
greater collective rights. 
State Capabilities 
 The Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) score is an index of a 
state’s proportion of total system capabilities.  This index was collected from the National 
Material Capabilities Data Set that is part of the Correlates of War Project.  This index is 
                                                 






based upon six component variables – military personnel, military expenditure, total 
population, urban population, iron and steel production, and energy consumption.  The 
CINC score is the most widely used indicator of national capabilities and serves as an 
indirect measure of a state’s power.  The CINC score is calculated by summing all 
observations on each of the six capability component variables for a given year, 
converting each state's total component to a share of the international system, and then 
averaging across the six components.   
The first component variable, military personnel, is explained “as troops under the 
command of the national government, intended for use against foreign adversaries, and 
held ready for combat as of January 1 of the referent year” (Correlates 2005 8).  Military 
expenditure, the second component variable, is defined simply “as the total military 
budget for a given states for a given year” (Correlates 2005 16).  Total population 
attempts to capture the sheer number of people within a state based upon a state’s census 
information.  Total population, it is theorized, allows a state with a larger population to 
“have a larger army, maintain its home industries during times of war, and absorb losses 
in wartime easier than a state with a smaller population” (Correlates 2005 21).  Urban 
population, the fourth component variable, serves to measure more intangible concepts.  
“Urbanization is associated with higher education standards and life expectancies, with 
industrialization and industrial capacity, and with the concentrated availability of citizens 
who may be mobilized during times of conflict” (Correlates 2005 27).  Urban population 
depicts the number of cities per state that have populations over 100,000.  Iron and steel 
production, the fifth component variable, measures the amount of iron and steel produced 





produced indicates the level of industrial capacity in the state.  The final component 
variable, Primary Energy Consumption (PEC), is also a measure of industrial capacity 
since “the greater the energy consumption, the larger the potential manufacturing base of 
an economy, the larger the potential economy of the state in question, and the more 
wealth and potential influence that state could or should have” (Correlates 2005 42). PEC 
is derived from four sources – coal, petroleum, electricity, and natural gas.  The data is 
presented in thousands of coal-ton equivalents.  As previously stated, these six 
component variables are combined to produce the CINC score. 
Contiguity 
 Collected from the Direct Contiguity data set of the Correlates of War Project, the 
contiguity variable identifies all direct contiguity relationships between states in the 
international system.  Although most contiguity data is dyadic, that format is not 
appropriate for this research.  Therefore, for each state of interest to the dissertation 
research, the number of land and water contiguities is presented for the states of interest.  
The contiguity classification system is made up of five categories.  One category 
represents land contiguity and the remaining four signify water contiguity.  The water 
contiguity classification system is “divided into four categories, based on the distances of 
12, 24, 150, and 400 miles” (Stinnett 2002).  Although 400 miles seems like a great 
distance, “400 miles is the maximum distance at which two 200 mile exclusive economic 
zones can intersect” (Stinnett 2002).  The variable is coded such that a zero indicates that 
a state lacks contiguity, a one signifies that a state is contiguous with one other state, and 







 The alliance control variable was collected through the Expected Utility 
Generation and Data Management Program (EUGene), but the original data is from the 
Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data Set.  This data set codes three types of 
alliances based upon their level of commitment.  A Type I alliance, or a defense pact, 
obligates states to militarily intervene on behalf of any member state that is attacked.  The 
neutrality or non-aggression pact, a Type II alliance, is a pledge to remain militarily 
neutral if any member state is attacked.  Finally, the Type III alliance, or ententes, 
promise consultation and/or cooperation in a time of crisis, which includes a military 
attack.  The variable is coded such that a zero indicates that a state does not participate in 
any formal alliances, a one indicates that the state is a member of one alliance, and so on.  
There is not an upper limit for this variable. 
 The various dependent, independent, and control variables allows for statistical 
analyses to be performed which will provide the answers to the research questions and 
hypotheses.  The four different data sets provide for the estimation of different time 
frames, states, and variables.  Overall, this will offer the most inclusive assessment of the 
data and will determine which political institutions are critical to democratic 

















 Chapter five is the first of three quantitative chapters needed to test the 
hypotheses and answer the pertinent research questions to this dissertation.  A two-stage 
analysis is necessary to test the relationship between political institutions, the level of 
democratization, and their collective effect on conflict.  This chapter examines the first 
stage of the analysis by testing the impact that political institutions have on democratic 
consolidation.  This chapter test two hypotheses: 
H1. States that are making the transition to democracy while establishing strong 
political institutions, as evidenced by a higher institutional index score, are more 
likely to consolidate democracy. 
 
H3. Governmental institutions have a greater positive influence on democratic 
consolidation than intermediary institutions. 
 
To test these hypotheses, a time series panel regression, with the fixed effects command, 
is used for the four data sets – 1974 through 2000, Entered System Late, Rule of Law / 
Bureaucratic Quality, and Regime Change. 
 A correlation matrix is presented for each of the four data sets because 
collinearity is a problem between the dependent variable, the level of democratization, 
measured by the Polity 2 score, and the institutional index.  The Polity 2 score and the 
institutional index share some of the same component variables, which explain the high 
level of collinearity.14   
 
                                                 
14 Thought was given to using change in the level of democratization as the dependent variable for this 
chapter.  However, it was determined that, regardless of collinearity, the level of democratization was the 
proper dependent variable for theoretical reasons.  The empirical results for the change in the level of 
democratization are briefly discussed in the conclusion of this chapter.  The results for each data set for the 







1974 – 2000 
 
 The first data set to be analyzed, 1974 through 2000, returns significant results 
supportive of the institutional threshold theory.  However, Table 5-1 presents a 
correlation matrix for the level of democratization and the institutional index which 
suggests that collinearity is a problem within this model.  This indicates that the high Z 
value associated with the institutional index can be attributed to collinearity.  However, 
the importance of the institutional index in democratic consolidation should not be 
understated. 
Table 5-1.  
Correlation Matrix between the Level of Democratization and the Institutional Index 
1974 through 2000 
 Level of Democratization Index 
Level of Democratization 1.0000  
Index 0.7780 1.0000 
 
 As Table 5-2 explains, the institutional index returns a significant result 
suggesting that democratic consolidation will occur as political institutions increase in 
legitimacy providing support for the institutional threshold theory.  The gross national 
product per capita variable returns results indicating that as the level of wealth per capita 
increases, the level of democratization will also increase.  The next variable to receive 
significant results is literacy indicating that as the adult population becomes more literate, 
the level of democratization will increase.  These results lend support to the literature 
suggesting that a threshold effect regarding GNP per capita and literacy rates is necessary 
for democratic consolidation.   
 The remaining variables do not return significant results.  Colonial legacy 





suggests that former British colonies are at an advantage to consolidate democracy; 
however, this model supplies contrary results.  The religion variable is also contrary to 
political development literature which suggests that predominately Protestant states are 
more likely to consolidate democracy.  However, these results suggests that Protestant 
religions are not advantaged over any other type of religion in the process of democratic 
consolidation.  The minorities at risk variable generates counter-intuitive results which 
suggest that as the number of minority at risk groups within a state increase, the level of 
democratization will also increase.   
 Overall, this model performs well with fifty-six percent of the variation within the 
data being explained, according to the R2 score.  The three pertinent independent 
variables, the institutional index, GNP per capita, and the literacy rate, all return results 



























Table 5-2. Time Series Panel Regression for the Level of Democratization 
1974 through 2000 Full Model 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
Index 
 
.1631886 .0033653 48.49**** 
GNP per capita 
 
.000131 .0000431 3.04*** 
Literacy  
 
.0561202 .0071838 7.81**** 
Colonial Legacy 
 
-.1553441 .827068 -0.19 
Religion 
 
-1.298377 1.190151 -1.09 
Minorities at Risk 
 
.0592063 .1710867 0.35 
Constant 
 
-15.81278 .6462727 -24.47**** 
n= 70 cases, 1890 observations 
Overall R2 = 0.5694 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
 Table 5-3 displays the results for the component variables of the institutional 
index for the 1974 through 2000 model.  The Z values are inflated due to collinearity 
between the component variables of the institutional index and the level of 
democratization indicator, the Polity 2 score.  All variables produce significant results 
ranging from .05 to .001.  The component variables coefficients demonstrate that minor 
positive changes in the institutional performance will lead to an increase in the level of 
democratization. 
 Both variables used to measure the executive branch are highly significant.  The 
constraints on the chief executive receives the highest Z value of the eleven component 
variables tested in the model, implying the importance of constraining the chief executive 





states that possess an open system of executive recruitment are more likely to consolidate 
democracy. 
 Two variables are also used to determine the role of the legislative branch in 
democratic consolidation.  Those states which possess an effective legislature, which is 
characterized by autonomy and the ability to override executive vetoes of legislation, are 
more likely to consolidate democracy.  Also, states that are able to either directly or 
indirectly popularly elect their legislative representation are more likely to consolidate 
democracy.   
 Constitutional checks are used as an indirect measure of the state’s constitutional 
checks and balances.  The model returns evidence to suggest that the more checks and 
balances that are placed on the legislative and executive branches will allow for 
democratic consolidation.  States that possess a civilian government, in which the 
military plays a subordinate role, are more likely to consolidate democracy.  Consistent 
with previous literature on democratization, the electoral system variable provides results 
demonstrating that a parliamentary system will more likely produce democratic 
consolidation than either a presidential or hybrid type of electoral system.   
 Four intermediary institutions are tested within this model.  The party legitimacy 
variable explains that including opposition political parties within the political arena will 
lead to democratic consolidation faster than excluding parties or only allowing for the 
dominant party to participate in the political arena.  Freedom of the press, meaning that 
the press is capable of operating as an arena of political competition, is a necessary 
component to democratic consolidation.  Universal suffrage receives the weakest Z value; 





privileges to all adult segments of the society, is basic to democratic consolidation.  
Finally, the free and fair elections variable provides results demonstrating that 
competitive elections are vital to the process of democratic consolidation. 
 The 1974 through 2000 model tests the entire time frame of interest to this 
dissertation, but does so for a reduced number of states.  These component variable 
models perform well which their high R2 scores substantiate.  
Table 5-3. Time Series Panel Regression for Level of Democratization 





Z Value Overall R2 
Openness of Exec. 
Recruitment 
.4862621 .0262011 18.56**** 0.2105 
Constraints on the  
Chief Executive 
1.268105 .0184267 68.82**** 0.7195 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
1.059095 .0348587 30.38**** 0.3801 
Legislative  
Selection 
.27487 .02477 11.10**** 0.1861 
Constitutional 
Checks 
2.251204 .0813734 27.67**** 0.4320 
Military 
 
.4477974 .0320501 13.97**** 0.1975 
Electoral System 
 
.6814662 .0343015 19.87**** 0.3159 
Party Legitimacy 
 
.8170248 .0230037 35.52**** 0.4960 
Press Freedom 
 
.8507744 .0352355 24.15**** 0.3524 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
.8318189 .0189572 43.88**** 0.5699 
Universal Suffrage 
 
.2057506 .0829641 2.48*** 0.1575 
n=70 cases,  1890 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 








Entered System Late 
 
 Once again, collinearity is a problem in the Entered System Late data set because 
of the shared values that exist between the institutional index and the level of 
democratization indicator.  Table 5-4 provides a correlation matrix that details the high 
level of collinearity between the variables.   
Table 5-4.  
Correlation Matrix between the Level of Democratization and the Institutional Index 
Entered System Late 
 Level of Democratization Index 
Level of Democratization 1.0000  
Index 0.7695 1.0000 
   
  
The full model for the Entered System Late data set produces supporting evidence 
for the institutional index and therefore the institutional threshold theory, but does not 
provide overwhelming evidence for the thresholds regarding wealth and education.  The 
institutional index is once again strongly significant signifying the importance of political 
institutions in increasing the level of democratization within a state.  Gross national 
product per capita is not significant, although it does suggest that the level of 
democratization will rise with an increase in per capita wealth.  The literacy rate also 
does not produce significant results, but it does provide evidence for the literacy rate 
threshold, which serves as a proxy for education, indicating that the level of 
democratization will increase with the literacy rate.   
 A significant result is received for the colonial legacy variable providing further 
evidence that a history of British colonialism does not advantage the state in the course of 
democratic consolidation.  The religion model returns different results than the 1974 





Protestant state will be more likely to consolidate democracy; however, the result is not 
significant.  Finally, although not statistically significant, the minorities at risk variable 
produces results consistent with conventional wisdom signifying that as the number of 
minority at risk groups within a state decrease, the level of democratization will increase. 
Table 5-5. Time Series Panel Regression for Level of Democratization 
Entered System Late Full Model 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
Index 
 
.1330936 .005322 25.01**** 
GNP per capita 
 
.0000556 .0000678 0.82 
Literacy  
 
.0119677 .0111683 1.07 
Colonial Legacy 
 
-1.346236 .8535777 -1.58* 
Religion 
 
1.446682 1.138932 1.27 
Minorities at Risk 
 
-.0920159 .161536 -0.57 
Constant 
 
-9.471771 .8900626 -10.64**** 
n=87 cases, 870 observations 
Overall R2 = 0.5855 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
 Once again, all of the component variables of the institutional index are 
statistically significant ranging from .10 to .001.  These models perform suitably, as their 
overall R2 scores demonstrate. 
Presented in Table 5-6, of the eleven component variables analyzed in this model, 
constraints on the chief executive is the best performer specifying the need to limit 
executive authority and maintain executive parity with other branches of the government.  





demonstrating the need for competitive elections that are deemed to be free and fair by 
independent observers.  Third, the strength of the legislative effectiveness variable 
indicates the need for an effective legislature that can serve as a check on the executive 
branch.  Fourth, the openness of executive recruitment variable suggests that if the 
politically active population has an opportunity to compete for the chief executive, the 
level of democratization will increase.  Further evidence is attained demonstrating that 
the inclusion of opposition political parties will serve to foster democratic consolidation.  
The sixth variable in decreasing order of statistical significance, the role of the military, 
produces evidence that democratic consolidation is more likely to occur under civilian 
governments rather than governments in which there is direct military control.  
Constitutional checks, the eight variable, suggests that restraining the power of the 
branches of government through checks and balances will produce democratic 
consolidation.  The electoral system variable provides further evidence that a 
parliamentary system is more likely to produce democratic consolidation.  The next to 
last variable in statistical significance is press freedom.  This does suggest, however, that 
press freedom is needed to provide for an open debate arena which is a critical element 
for democratic consolidation.  Finally, universal suffrage receives the least support.  
However, the variable is still significant indicating that all adults should be awarded 













Table 5-6. Time Series Panel Regression for Level of Democratization 





Z Value Overall R2 
Openness of Exec. 
Recruitment 
.4734754 .0334296 14.16**** 0.2523 
Constraints on the  
Chief Executive 
1.006265 .0323295 31.13**** 0.6882 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
.8547808 .054009 15.83**** 0.3859 
Legislative  
Selection 
.3001504 .0335852 8.94**** 0.1697 
Constitutional 
Checks 
.7612387 .0964554 7.89**** 0.2967 
Military 
 
.4137991 .0411599 10.05**** 0.1891 
Electoral System 
 
.3051517 .0453775 6.72**** 0.2592 
Party Legitimacy 
 
.337262 .0297563 11.33**** 0.2373 
Press Freedom 
 
.145379 .0359362 4.05**** 0.1911 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
.5358527 .0239719 22.35**** 0.5205 
Universal 
Suffrage 
.1828592 .1416975 1.29* 0.1331 
n=87 cases, 870 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
Rule of Law / Bureaucratic Quality 
 
 Table 5-8 displays the results for the rule of law / bureaucratic quality data set.  
As indicated by Table 5-7, similar to the previous two data sets, collinearity is a problem 
because of the shared variables between the institutional index and the Polity 2 score.  
Although collinearity is serving to amplify the institutional index Z value, the model 





also provides considerable evidence for the education threshold and some evidence for 
the wealth threshold for democratic consolidation. 
Table 5-7.  
Correlation Matrix between the Level of Democratization and the Institutional Index 
Rule of Law / Bureaucratic Quality 
 Level of Democratization Index 
Level of Democratization 1.0000  
Index 0.7842 1.0000 
 
The rule of law / bureaucratic quality data set includes those component variables 
in the institutional index.  That data is not available for all countries and all years of 
interest to the dissertation; therefore, sixty-two cases are tested for the years 1982 through 
1997.  As with the previous data sets, this data set offers empirical support for the 
institutional index and the institutional threshold theory indicating the necessity of 
political institutional consolidation as a forerunner to democratic consolidation.  The 
literacy rate, or education threshold, receives great support from this model suggesting 
that democratic consolidation will occur with an increase in the literacy rate.  The gross 
national product per capita, or wealth threshold for democratic consolidation, receives 
minimal support from this model since it is not statistically significant.   
 The colonial legacy variable, again contrary to political development literature, 
does not support the notion that a history as a British colony will lead to democratic 
consolidation.  Also contrary to political development literature, the religion variable 
signifies that predominately Protestant states are not at an advantage in the process of 
democratic consolidation.  Finally, the minorities at risk variable generates counter-
intuitive results denoting that the level of democratization will increase with the number 






Table 5-8. Time Series Panel Regression for Level of Democratization 
Rule of Law / Bureaucratic Quality Full Model 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
Index 
 
.1808886 .0049052 36.88**** 
GNP per capita 
 
.0000528 .0000594 0.89 
Literacy  
 
.0492494 .0110981 4.44**** 
Colonial Legacy 
 
-.2309108 .9391032 -0.25 
Religion 
 
-1.0729 1.405036 -0.76 
Minorities at Risk 
 
.0767105 .1954396 0.39 
Constant 
 
-18.9331 .9136207 -20.72**** 
n=62 cases, 992 observations 
Overall R2 = 0.5934 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
 The outputs for the component variables, including the rule of law and 
bureaucratic quality, are displayed in Table 5-9.  The rule of law and bureaucratic quality 
component variables are both statistically significant, yet their significance levels are 
considerably weaker than the other component variable that compose the institutional 
index.  The rule of law variable indicates that a strong court system that can implement 
laws and adjudicate disputes is important to democratic consolidation.  The bureaucratic 
quality variable signifies the importance of a professionalized and meritorious 
bureaucracy, rather than a system based on political patronage, is also valuable to 
democratic consolidation. 
 Constraints on the chief executive and free and fair elections are once again the 





consolidation.  Party legitimacy is the most important intermediary institution to the 
process of democratic consolidation, while universal suffrage is the only variable in the 
model that does not return significant results. 
Table 5-9. Time Series Panel Regression for Level of Democratization 





Z Value Overall R2 




.0436215 15.15**** 0.2030 



















.1128871 19.27**** 0.4538 
Rule of Law 
 















.0310954 26.64**** 0.4710 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 





.0492012 16.32**** 0.3636 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
.8309342 .0249982 33.24**** 0.6262 
Universal Suffrage 
 
.1289847 .183825 0.70 0.1784 
n=62 cases, 992 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 












 The last data set to addressed using the level of democratization as the dependent 
variable is Regime Change.  As its name suggests, this data set includes a variable that 
analyses mild to dramatic regime changes.  Since this data is not available for all states 
and years of interest, sixty-two states are analyzed covering the years 1974 through 1992.  
Table 5-10 displays the collinearity problems between the institutional index and the 
level of democratization indicator that has been troubling throughout this chapter. 
Table 5-10.  
Correlation Matrix between the Level of Democratization and the Institutional Index  
Regime Change 
 Level of Democratization Index 
Level of Democratization 1.0000  
Index 0.7285 1.0000 
 
 As Table 5-11indicates, the three most important independent variables to this 
model, the institutional index, GNP per capita, and the literacy rate, all find supporting 
evidence from the Regime Change data set.  The institutional index is strongly significant 
indicating the central role that political institutions play in democratic consolidation.  The 
model also denotes, based upon the coefficients, that slight changes in the institutional 
index will lead to an increase in the level of democratization.  The wealth threshold, 
measured by GNP per capita, is supported by this model which suggests that democratic 
consolidation is more likely to occur in wealthier states.  Also, the literacy rate provides 
evidence for the education threshold implying that higher educated states are more likely 
to consolidate democracy.   
Although hardly significant, this model returns the only results that correspond 
with political development literature suggesting that British colonies have an advantage 





inconsistent with political development literature as the variable suggests that 
predominately Protestant states are not any more likely than other types of religions to 
consolidate democracy.  The minorities at risk variable returns somewhat concerning 
results as it implies that democratic consolidation will increase with an escalation in the 
number of minority at risk groups within a state. 
The new variable to this data set, regime change, provides strongly significant 
results that may be troubling.  This variable implies that democratic consolidation will 
occur when more dramatic regime changes take place.  This is concerning if the 
revolutionary group is “anti-system” and fundamentally restructures the political system 
within the state.  However, it is not troubling if the regime change dramatically alters the 





























Table 5-11. Time Series Panel Regression for Level of Democratization 
Regime Change Full Model 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
Index 
 
.1374785 .0040654 33.82**** 
GNP per capita 
 
.0002167 .0001118 1.94** 
Literacy  
 
.037451 .0093478 4.01**** 
Colonial Legacy 
 
.0136184 .7376168 0.02 
Religion 
 
-1.881476 1.086137 -1.73** 
Minorities at Risk 
 
.1673189 .1641686 1.02 
Regime Change 
 
.5918719 .0720043 8.22**** 
Constant 
 
-13.9179 .6561841 -21.21**** 
n=62 cases, 1178 observations 
Overall R2 = 0.5476 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
 The inclusion of regime change into the models for the component variables of 
the institutional index does not alter the performance of the variables.  Displayed in Table 
5-12, as with the previous models, constraints on the chief executive produces the highest 
significance level with free and fair elections and party legitimacy placing second and 
third.  With the exception of universal suffrage, all variables are statistically significant at 
.001 indicating that each of these variables has a critical function in the process of 










Table 5-12. Time Series Panel Regression for Level of Democratization 





Z Value Overall R2 




.0287297 14.72**** 0.2172 







































.0486407 17.42**** 0.3564 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
.8362389 .0239199 34.96**** 0.6223 
Universal Suffrage 
 
.063757 .0909597 0.70 0.1852 
n=62 cases, 1178 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 




 Because of the collinearity that exists between the level of democratization, the 
dependent variable, and the institutional index, it is necessary to use alternative models to 
determine the accuracy of the initial results.  Two alternative dependent variables, the 
Freedom House Democracy Indicator and the change in the level of democratization, are 





 The Freedom House data alternative model is tested using a time series panel 
regression with a three year moving average.  This means that the institutional index is 
lagged for three years and an average of those three years is then regressed, using the 
time series panel technique, on the Freedom House data.   
  Table 5-13 provides the results, using the Freedom House Democracy Indicator as 
the dependent variable, of the full models for the four different data sets.  With small 
variations, using the Freedom House Democracy Indicator as the dependent variable, the 
results are duplicates of the level of democratization findings.  Across all four data sets, 
the Freedom House data results reduce the statistical significance of the institutional 
index, although it is still strongly significant, while increase the significance levels of the 
other independent variables such as the gross national product per capita, the literacy rate, 
colonial legacy, religion, and minorities at risk.  This suggests that, after solving the 
collinearity problem, the institutional index is still overwhelmingly significant in the 
process of democratic consolidation, yet the other independent variables also have a role 
to play in democratic consolidation.  This was overlooked in the initial results that had 

















Table 5-1315. Time Series Panel Regression (with a 3 year moving average)  
for the Freedom House Democracy Indicator (Full Models) 



















Literacy  .011*** 
 















- 0.201** -.229*** -.110 
Regime Change 
 
   .103** 
Constant 1.720**** 
 
2.911**** 1.418*** 1.899**** 
Overall R2 
 
.497 .503 .510 .427 








*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
 Table 5-14 provides the results, using the Freedom House Democracy Indicator as 
the dependent variable, of the component variables of the institutional index for the four 
different data sets.  Once again, the findings are duplicates of the initial results.  The 
Freedom House data does reduce the significance levels of the component variables; 
however, removing the collinearity from the models still produce overwhelming support 
for strengthening the component variables of the institutional index as a means to 
consolidate democracy. 
                                                 
15 The results for each data set, using the Freedom House Democracy Indicator as the dependent variable, 






Table 5-14. Time Series Panel Regression (with a 3 year moving average)  
for the Freedom House Democracy Indicator (Institution Models) 










.161**** .096**** .162**** .078**** 
Constraints on 
Chief Exec. 
.379**** .230**** .360**** .255**** 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
.430**** .239**** .452**** .284**** 
Legislative 
Selection 
.145**** .096**** .141**** .090**** 
Constitutional 
Checks 
.634**** .178*** .517**** .147** 
Rule of Law 
 
  .084**  
Military 
 
.203**** .211**** .227**** .132**** 
Electoral 
System 
.182**** .044* .154**** .112**** 
Party 
Legitimacy 
.315**** .060*** .301**** .299**** 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
  .117**  
Press Freedom 
 
.383**** .041** .313**** .346**** 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
.234**** .103**** .192**** .140**** 
Universal 
Suffrage 











*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
 The second alternative model utilizes the change in the level of democratization 
as the dependent variable.  Although it is more difficult to produce statistically significant 
results when using change as the dependent variable, Table 5-15 indicates that the 
institutional index is statistically significant in two of the four models.  Overall, these 





however, it can be concluded that the institutional index is a necessary component of 
democratic consolidation. 
Table 5-1516. 
Time Series Panel Regression for the Change in the Level of Democratization  
(Full Models) 










.004 .003 .007*** 
GNP per capita -.001 
 
.001 -.001 -.001 
Literacy  .001 
 
-.009*** .003 .001 
Colonial 
Legacy 
-.349*** -.169 -.354** -.343** 
Religion 
 
.100 .267 .222 .192 
Minorities at 
Risk 
.009 .038 -.035 -.015 
Regime Change 
 
   .383**** 
Constant .032 
 
.506* .182 -.114 
Overall R2 
 
.008 .009 .011 .047 








*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
 The findings of the component variables of the institutional index are found in 
Table 5-16.  Several variables return results worth noting.  Across all four models, the 
openness of executive recruitment and the constraints placed on the chief executive are 
both strongly significant.  This indicates that granting the politically active population the 
                                                 
16 The results for each data set, using change in the level of democratization as the dependent variable, can 






opportunity to compete for the chief executive position through an electoral process will 
lead to an increase in the level of democratization.  Also, this suggests that placing 
constraints on the chief executive through accountability organizations will also lead to a 
democratic increase.  The role of the military is statistically significant across all four 
data sets signifying that as the civilian government subordinates control of the military, 
democracy will also increase.  The electoral system variable generates results 
demonstrating that a parliamentary system will more likely produce democratic 
consolidation than either a presidential or hybrid type of electoral system.  Finally, the 
free and fair elections variable is significant specifying the need for competitive elections 
in the process of democratic consolidation.  There is also some evidence to suggest that a 





























Time Series Panel Regression for the Change in the Level of Democratization  
(Institution Models) 










.024*** .062**** .039*** .022** 
Constraints on 
Chief Exec. 
.066**** .075**** .069**** .089**** 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
.027* .022 .021 .040** 
Legislative 
Selection 
.006 -.014 -.002 .020* 
Constitutional 
Checks 
-.198**** -.223**** -.257**** -.293**** 
Rule of Law 
 
  -.035  
Military 
 
.043**** .061*** .040** .060**** 
Electoral 
System 
-.059**** -.059*** -.043** -.073**** 
Party 
Legitimacy 
.035*** .011 .031** .057**** 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
  -.004  
Press Freedom 
 
-.006 -.049** -.032** .016 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
.035**** .035*** .032*** .061**** 
Universal 
Suffrage 











*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
















 The purpose of this chapter has been to test the first stage of analysis by 
examining the impact that political institutions have on democratic consolidation.  
Because of the need to use four different data sets, due to data limitations, it is important 
to draw conclusions across the entire chapter.  Overall, this chapter provides strong 
empirical evidence regarding the need to strengthen political institutions as a prerequisite 
to democratic consolidation.  The chapter also lends support for the wealth and education 
thresholds.   
Using the level of democratization as the dependent variable, the most important 
independent variable to this dissertation, the institutional index, receives strong empirical 
support.  The institutional index is the means through which the institutional threshold 
theory is tested on the level of democratization as the dependent variable.  As can be seen 
in Figure 5-1, the institutional index is highly significant across the four different data 
sets.  Nonetheless, the strong empirical support implies that following the institutional 
threshold theory, meaning that a majority of a states political institutions have been 
strengthened, will reduce the amount of time that states spend in the democratizing 
process, thereby eliminating the dangerous and disruptive behavior that is associated with 
democratization.  This also prevent states from becoming entrenched anocracies because 
they have focused on regime reforms and have political institutions in place that serve to 









Figure 5-1. Performance of the Institutional Index17 























 Through the use of its control variables, this chapter has tested the well-
established
 




und to suggest 
at sta g a 
le, 
democratic consolidation will occur with an increase in minorities at risk groups located 
                                                
d atic consolidation.  Strong support was found across the four data sets for the 
education threshold implying that higher levels of education are necessary for democrat
consolidation because of the participatory aspects involved in a democracy.  Weaker 
evidence was attained across the data sets for the wealth threshold.  However, it can
concluded that affluence will allow for democratic consolidation to take place more 
rapidly.   
 Contrary to the political development literature, no support was fo
th tes are advantaged in democratic consolidation if they have a history of bein
British colony or are predominately Protestant in religion.  The final control variab
minorities at risk, returned insignificant but counter-intuitive results indicating that 
 
17 The conclusion section of each of the quantitative chapters, Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, include 
figures which detail the performance of the institutional index, the level of democratization, and the 
performance of the component variables of the institutional index based upon their significance levels.  The 
variables are statistically significant at the .05 level of 1.65.  Anything above 1.65 on the bar charts 





within the state.  An explanation for these results may be that minorities at risk groups 
work within the political system rather than resorting to violent tactics.  
 As Figure 5-2 indicates, the component variables of the institutional index 
perform with relative equivalency across all data sets.  The chart also displays the 
importance of all thirteen component variables of the institutional index in the process o
democratic consolidation because all variables returned significant results.  Ba
these results, an order of importance can be assigned to these variables.   
 Of the eight governmental institutions, constraints on the chief executive was 
best performer indicating the critical importance in constraining the chief executive to 




remaining institutions are ordered based upon 
n in 
emocratic consolidation. 
 Across all four data sets, free and fair elections is the most important intermediary 
institution to democratic consolidation.  Party legitimacy is a close second, followed by 









their decreasing level of importance to democratic consolidation – legislative 
effectiveness, constitutional checks, openness of executive recruitment, the electoral 
system, the role of the military, legislative selection, and the rule of law.  Therefore, 
according to these results, the rule of law is the least critical governmental institutio
the process of d
ed upon its insignifican





Figure 5-2. Performance of the Component Variables of the Institutional Index 

























































s the results found initially using the level of 
democratization as the dependent variable. 
Freedom House 
 The inclusion of two alternative dependent variables allows for more confidence 
to be placed on the initial findings, regardless of the collinearity problem in the data.  The
summary information for the Freedom House data can be found in Figures 5-3 and 5-4.  
















Figure 5-3. Performance of the Institutional Index 
























Figure 5-4. Performance of the Component Variables of the Institutional Index 

































Change in the Level of Democratization 
x 
ening political institutions 
will lead to an increase in the level of democratization.  
Figure 5-5. Performance  the Institutional Index 
Change in the Level of Democratization 
 
Figure 5-5 and 5-6 present the summary information for the institutional index 
and the component variables of the institutional index using the change in the level of 
democratization as the dependent variable.  As Figure 5-5 displays, the institutional inde

























 Figure 5-6 portrays the component variable information.  Compared to the results 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the variables perform somewhat differently.  However, 
the two most significant variables are the constraints placed on the chief executive and 














Change in the Level of Democratization 
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Strong evidence was gathered to support Hypothesis 1.  States that focus on 
regime reforms, primarily strengthening their political institutions, will consolidate 
democracy. 
H3. Governmental institutions have a greater positive influence on democratic 
consolidation than intermediary institutions. 
 
 Hypothesis 3 suggests that governme al institutions are more important to 
democratic consolidation than intermediary institutions.  However, this chapter did not 
produce any supporting evidence for this hypothesis.  In fact, evidence is gathered to 
demonstrate that both governmental and inte ediary institutions are vital to democratic 
consolidation. 
 
 Overall, this chapter tested two hypotheses: 
 
H1. States that are making the transition to democracy while establishing strong 








 This chapter has served to test the first stage of analysis between political 
institutions and the level of democratization.  The next two quantitative chapters will test 
the second stage of analysis by examining the relationship that exists between political 
























Chapter 6 – Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Introduction 
examin vel of democratization, and their 
cti ed 
interstate dispute which “refers to historical cases in which the threat, display, or use of 
military force by one member state is exp rected towards the government, official 
representatives, official forces, propert of another state” (Jones, Bremer, and 
heses on 
wo 
e transition to democracy while establishing strong 
political institutions, as evidenced by a higher institutional index score, are less 
 
consolidation than intermediary institutions. 
 This quantitative chapter tests the second stage of analysis through an 
ation of political institutions, a state’s le
colle ve effect on conflict.  The dependent variable for chapter six is the militariz
licitly di
y, or territory 
Singer 1996 168).  This chapter remains consistent with previous research on the 
democratic peace and democratization and war since it tests the theory and hypot
external conflict.  A time series panel logit using a combination of random and fixed 
effects commands is the quantitative method employed in the chapter.  Once again, 
because of data limitations, four data sets are necessary to evaluate the institutional 
threshold theory, answer the research questions, and test the related hypotheses.  T
hypotheses are tested in this quantitative chapter: 
H2. States that are making th
likely to be involved in armed conflict. 
H3. Governmental institutions have a greater positive influence on democratic 
 
Results 
1974 – 2000 
 Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter tests two models per data set – the 





institutional index, whereas in the institution variables model, the component variab
are used instead of the institutional index.  The
les 






his lends weak 
support fo
 el is prima  by the ariables. s at 
 capabilities, ity are stron cant.  The m ies at risk 
dicates that a states involvement in ill increase e minority 
 to sk” within the state.  The state capabilities variable 
te c  acting as an e the 
vement in  interstate disputes will also increas gests that 
states are wielding their power in the international system in an attempt to amplify that 
power, through conflict if necessary.  The contiguity variable remains consistent with 
the entire time frame of interest, but does so for a reduced number of countries. As Table 
6-1 demonstrates, overall, this model performs well with a high Wald chi2 score; 
however, the majority of the explanatory variables of this model are not the variables o
importance to the dissertation.  
 The level of democratization indicator, the Polity 2 score, appears to be counte
intuitive because there is a weak positive relationship which suggests that a state’s 
involvement in militarized interstate disputes will increase as the level of democratizatio
increases.  However, this actually lends support for Mansfield and Snyder’s contradicto
premise to the democratic peace which suggests that democratizing states are more war 
prone than any other type of regime.  Like the Polity 2 score, the institutional index is not
significant.  However, it does imply that a states participation in militarized interstate 
disputes will increase as political institutions become less viable.  T
r the institutional threshold theory. 
This mod rily explained  conflict control v  Minoritie
risk, state and contigu gly signifi inorit
variables in  conflict w as mor
groups are declared be “at ri
signifies that as sta apabilities,  indicator of state’s power, increas





conflict literature demo hat a states i t in MIDs w ore likely for 
s that have n ntiguous re .  The only c ble that 
riable, implies that an increase in alliance membership 
ment in militarized interstate disputes.      
eries Panel Logit for Militarized Interstate Disputes 
974 through 2000 Full Model18 
Error Z Value 
nstrating t nvolvemen ill be m
those state umerous co lationships ontrol varia
is not significant, the alliance va
will lead to more involve
Table 6-1. Time S
1




.0211707 .0179865 1.18 
Index 
 
-.0024335 .0038023 -0.64 
Minorities at Risk 
 
.25591 .0475515 5.38**** 
State Capabilities 
 
78.26133 28.95366 2.70*** 
Contiguity .1620006 .038797 4.18**** 
 
Alliances .0115638 .0083105 1.39 
 
Constant -2.748276 .3944428 -6.97**** 
 
n= 70 cases, 1890 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
1, one-tailed test 
The es whether 
the model has accurately predicted the outcom f the ent variable, which in this 
case is the presence of a militarized in e d e. ted probabilities greater 
than .5 assume that a MID is esent, 
                                                
Wald chi2 = 127.44     
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .00
logit model allows for the generation of probabilities which indicat
e o  depend
terstat isput   Predic
 pr whereas probabilities less than .499 suggest the 
 
18 To improve the model, a combination of random an xed effects regression is used.  The following 
countries are used as dichotomous variables – Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua, Niger, South Korea, and 







absence of a militarized interstate dispute.  As Table 6-2 displays, this particular m
predicted 76% of the total observations in the data set.  The model predicted 90% of the
no conflict situations correctly, whereas only 40% of the conflict situations were 
predicted accurately.  The model does not predict the instances of conflict as well
instances of peace, which is partly the fault of model misspecification, but is also an 
artifact of logit analysis since the models always predict the “0” situations more 
accurately. 
Table 6-2. Predicted Outcomes for Militarized Interstate Disputes 
 0 1 Total 
odel 
 
 as the 
1974 through 2000 
0 1205 129 1334 
1 334 222 556 
Total 1539 351 1890 
 
  As Table 6-3 illustrates, more than half of the component variables of the 
institutional index return evidence supporting the institutional threshold theory and the 
role that political institutions play in democratic consolidation and the prevention of 
militarized interstate disputes.  Two variables are used to measure the role of the 
legislative and executive branches.  All four component variables support the necessity of 
the institutional threshold.  The openness of executive recruitment variable indicates that 
those regimes that have an open system of recruitment for the chief executive will be less 
likely to be involved in a militarized interstate dispute.  Although not significant, 
according to the constraint on the chief executive variables, states that do not place 
formal constraints on the decision-making power of the chief executive are more likely to 





branch is autonomous and has the ability to create and implement laws, are more likely to
be involved in external conflict.  States that possess a non-existent or non-elected 
legislature are also more likely to be involved in a militarized interstate dispute.   
 If the state has a military government, in which there is direct military control, it 
is more likely to be involved in
 




favorable to democratic consolidation.  The f l variable to return results consistent with 
the institu
sign uggests es whi e press  that t
 operating as an arena of p petitio  likely
 dispute fficients  significan s 
a small a ad to an e in 
terstate
stitu ks variab egitimacy nd fair ele d 
suffrage re  inconsis ypothes ts.  As i  by 
es els perfo ly well. er, the ex  
d e conflict control variables, op  the comp
insti ex and t ocra n indicator
d atization literature, states that have a parliamentary type of electoral system, 
rather than a presidential or hybrid system, are more likely to be involved in external 
conflict.  The democratization literature suggests that parliamentary governments are 
more inclusive, more likely to consolidate democracy, and produce long-term, stabl
democratic regimes.  However, this model suggests that presidential systems are
ina
tional threshold theory is press freedom.  Although the variable is not 
ificant, it s that those stat ch lack a fre , meaning he press is 
not capable of olitical com n, are more  to be 
involved in militarized interstate s.  The coe  of the t variable
suggest that decrease in their institutional perform nce will le  increas
militarized in  disputes. 
 The con tional chec le, party l , free a ctions, an
universal turn results tent with h ized effec ndicated
the Wald chi2 scor , these mod rm relative   Howev planatory
variables in the mo el are th posed to onent 







Table 6-3 es Panel ilitarize rstate Dispu
1974 through 2000 Institution Variables 
nt S ndar  
Error 
Z Value Wald chi2 
. Time Seri Logit for M d Inte tes 




512 .0146628 -2.13*** 131.08 
Constraints on the  
Chief Executive 
-.0256285 .0331857 -0.77 127.92 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
-.0457815 .0263586 -1.74*** 131.15 
Legisla
Selection 
tive  -.009786 .0142873 -0.68 127.89 
Constitutional .0831816 .062963 1.32* 126.06 
Checks 
Military -.0300575 .0181408 -1.66** 131.85 
  
Electoral System .0378881 .0201961 1.88** 129.02 
 




-.0143266 .0234624 -0.61 126.07 
Free an
Elections 
 d Fair .0018266 .0204239 0.09 125.81
Universal .0042423 .0417613 0.10 126.17 
Suffrage 
n= 70 cases, 1890 observations      
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p  .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test  
Entered System Late 
Entere
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
≤
d System Late is the next data set to be discussed.  This data set accounts 
for a sm
model 
aller time frame, 1991 through 2000.  However, all of the countries of interest to 
this dissertation are included in the data set.  As Table 6-4 indicates, the model does not 
return considerable evidence to support the institutional threshold theory.  The 
does not perform well overall, which is indicated by the goodness of fit test, the low 





The Polity 2 score, or the level of democratization indicator returns results 
consistent with conventional wisdom suggesting that an increase in militarized interstate
disputes will occur with a decrease in the level of democratization.  This does not, 
however, produce evidence for Mansfield and Snyder’s contradictory claim to the 
democratic peace.  The institutional index produces results that are counter-intuitive 
suggesting that external conflict will increase with the consolidation of political 
institutions.   
  The four conflict control variables produce significant results in this model.  The 
minorities at risk variable once again indicates that involvement in MIDs will increa
minority groups located within the state are declared to be “at risk.”  The state 
capabilities variable performs differently than in the previous model.  However, this 
not concerning because state capabilities can work in either a positive or negative fa





ities can lead to external 
conflict.   often 
exert nce in the system, nflict if n  
vely, a reduct apabilities, or the loss of power, m ce states to 
o external confl ns to increa te capabilitie er.  This 
t m interstate disp crease as a s r, or 
se. uity variable
icating tha at has more contiguous relationship re likely be 
 a militarize e dispute.  T variable also s 
 that in the p del.  Once a s not problem se 
alliance membership can serve to either increase or mitigate a states involvement in 
States that have more power, meaning they have more capabilities, will
 their influe international  through armed co ecessary. 
Alternati ion in state c ay for
resort t ict as a mea se their sta s and pow
model indicates tha ilitarized utes will in tates powe
capabilities, decrea  The contig  performs in accordance with conflict 
literature ind t a state th s will mo
involved in d interstat he alliance  perform





militarized interstate disputes.  Alliance membership can function as a deterrent to 
al conflict.   
 Series Panel Logit for Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Entered System Late Full Model19 
efficient Standard Error Z Value 







 -.0432608 .0421918 -1.03 
Index .0294865 .0102159 2.89*** 
 




-45.7147 32.22855 -1.42* 
Contiguity 
 
.2056284 .0809656 2.54*** 
Alliances 
 
-.242026 .0166828 -1.45* 
Constant 
 
-4.779539 1.016526 -4.70**** 
n=  87 cases, 
Wald chi2 = 37.16   
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
This model does not perform well overall; however, as Table 6-5 displays, it does 
predict 88% of the no conflict situations correctly, 34% of the conflict situations 





                                                







19 The inclusion of dichotomous variables for particul  countries did not improve the model, so they were 






Table 6-5. Predicted Outcomes Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Entered System Late 
 0 1 Total 
0 491 66 557 
1 208 105 313 
Total 699 171 870 
 
As Table 6-6 displays, all of the com tion index 
perform inconsistently with hypothesized effects.  This model does not provide any 
support for the institutional threshold theory and its role in democratic consolidation.  As 
the Wald chi2 indicate, the models do not perform well.  However, any explanatory value 






























Table 6-6 es Panel ilitarize  Dispu
Entered System Late Institution Variables 
ient S ndar  
Error 
Z Value Wald chi2 
. Time Seri Logit for M d Interstate tes 




898 .0323236 0.92 30.70 
Constraints on the  
Chief Executive 
.0357146 .0596781 0.60 30.62 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
.0148 29.90 374 .061183 0.24 
L tive  .1136666 .0396129 2.87*** 36.26 egisla
Selection 
Constitutional .0180224 .0952869 0.19 29.92 
Checks 
Military .1230721 .049141 2.50*** 32.51 
 
Electoral System .1098373 .0420326 2.61*** 34.96 
 
Party Legitimacy .0632111 .0330678 1.91** 31.02
 
 
Press Freedom .0550279 .0348326 1.58* 32.80 
 
Free and Fair .0277403 .0336561 0.82 30.6
Elections 
0 
Universal .0310804 .0094605 3.29**** 44.98 
Suffrage 
n= 87 cases, 870 observations     
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p  .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test  
Ru
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
≤
le of Law / Bureaucratic Quality 
ain, 
 The Rule of Law / Bureaucratic Quality data set performs better than the Entered 
System Late data set which is supported by the strong Wald chi2 score.  As Table 6-8 
indicates, this data set predicts 75% of the total observations correctly.  The model 
predicts 88% of the no conflict situations accurately, but only 47% of the instances of 
conflict.  Presented in Table 6-7, the two independent variables of interest to this 





do not perform well in this model.  The level of democratization indicator is not 
statistically significant; however, it is signed in the proper direction suggesting weak 
support for Mansfield and Snyder’s claim that democratizing states are more war prone 
than either authoritarian or democratic regim reshold theory, 
however, does not receive any support from this model since the result is inconsistent 
with hypothesized effects.   
 The minorities at risk variable is high  significant indicating that the number of 
at risk groups within a state will impact the likelihood for involvement in a militarized 
interstate dispute.  The state capabilities vari le is strongly significant suggesting that 
states that have more power are more likely to be involved in external conflict as they 
demonstrate their power in the international tem.  The significant contiguity variable 
provides r  be 
involved in an increased nu s.  The ol variab
t to the mode s.  Howeve dicate that n s alliance 





















esults suggesting that states that have more neighbors are more likely to
mber of MID  only conflict contr le not 






Table 6-7. Time Series Panel Logit for Militarized Interstate Disputes 
f Law / Bureaucratic Quality Full Model20 
 





-.0075254 .0254694 -0.30 
Index 
 
.0023034 .0054418 0.42 
Minorities at Risk 
 
.2194762 .047553 4.62**** 
State Capabilities 
 
173.1723 26.32252 6.58**** 
Contiguity .0621903 .0384635 1.62* 
 
Alliances .0050141 .010247 0.49 
 
Constant -2.691036 .6296854 -4.27**** 
 
n= 62 cases, 992 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
Wald chi2 = 113.28   
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
Table 6-8. Predicted Outcomes Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Rule of Law / Bureaucratic Quality  
 0 1 Total 
0 
 
593 83 676 
1 
 
167 149 316 
Total 760 232 992 
 
 Approximately half of the component variables of the institutional index, found in 
Table 6-9, lend support for the institutional threshold theory in the Rule of Law / 
Bureaucratic Quality data set.  The rule of law variable returns results that are counter-
intuitive and not consistent with hypothesized effects because the results suggest that a
                                                
s 
 
countries are used as dichotomous variables – Brazil, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Thailand.  The 
20 To improve the model, a combination of random and fixed effects regression is used.  The following 





the rule of law becomes more sound the state will participate in more militarized 
interstate disputes.  Although not significant, the bureaucratic quality variable provides 
weak evidence for the institutional threshold theory suggesting that a professionalized 
and meritorious bureaucracy will prevent involvement in MIDs.   
The openness of executive recruitment indicates the need to allow all political
active members of the population to compete for the chief executive as a means to 
prevent involvement in external conflict.  It is also necessary to constra
ly 





emocratization literature.  For the first 
time in th ing that 
a pr  facilita bate are  to prev emen
ict.  Th able tha ort for t itutional th
is demo e need to uffrage to  
the soci ttempt to reduce involvement in MIDs. 
egislati  variable onal checks, party legitim  free 
s are ning vari  not sup nce for 
resho his indi s the cit  ability to elect their 
ve through accountability and parity organizations, such as the legislative and 
judicial branches, in an attempt to reduce state involvement in militarized interstate 
disputes.  The significant legislative effectiveness variable indicates the need to have a
effective, rather than a rubber-stamp legislature.  An effective legislature will serve t
lessen state involvement in MIDs.  Those states that have a civilian, rather than military 
government, are more likely to avoid involvement in militarized interstate disputes.  O
again, evidence is attained to suggest that parliamentary systems are more likely to be 
involved in external conflict, which is contrary to d
is chapter, the press freedom variable returns significant results suggest
ess that can te an open de na is likely ent involv t in 
external confl e final vari t lends supp he inst reshold 
theory is universal suffrage.  Th nstrates th  grant s all adult
members of ety in an a
The l ve selection , constituti acy, and
and fair election  the remai able that do ply evide the 





legislature, constitut s and ba inclusio position po
lit and free ctions in e level o ized 
w ease.  O ese resu unter-in
 mode elatively ever, m  the explan wer 
 to control v
e 6-9 es Panel ilitarize rstate Dispu
Rule of Law / Bureaucratic Quality Institution Variables 
ble ent ard 
Error 
alue hi2 
ional check lances, the n of op litical 
parties into the po ical arena, and fair ele crease, th f militar
interstate disputes ill also incr bviously, th lts are co tuitive.  
Overall, these ls perform r  well.  How uch of atory po
can be attributed the conflict ariables.  
Tabl . Time Seri Logit for M d Inte tes 
Varia
 
Coeffici Stand Z V Wald c
Openness of -.0208436 2 -1.03 
Exec. Rect. 
.020 992 115.02 
Constraints on the  -.0491
Chief Executive 
732 .044782 -1.10 121.01 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
-.049071 .0367131 -1.34* 120.86 
Legislative  
Selection 
.0096164 .0225618 0.43 114.69 
Constitutional 
Checks 
.2085929 .0835384 2.50*** 114.01 
Rule of Law 
 
.0231245 .0358864 0.64 111.79 
Military 
 
-.0332176 .0263792 -1.26 123.14 
Electoral System 
 
.0754335 .0286808 2.63*** 108.84 
Party Legitimacy 
 
.0777313 .0281984 2.76*** 106.66 




439999 .0285708 -1.54* 119.16 
Free and Fair .0174989 .0263526 0.66 116.95 
Elections 
Universal -.0039284 .061015 -0.06 115.67 
Suffrage 
n= 62 cases, 992 observations     
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test  
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 






 The final data set to be discussed, using militarized interstate disputes as the 
dependent variable, is the Regime Change data set.  This data set includes a regime 
 of the 
 
gnificant, the level of 
democrat ment in 
extern s.  This doe  to Ma r’s conte
ization will a t. 
All of the confl ariables are nt in this model.  Consistent 
r, the at risk varia tes results d at 
e d lvement will escalate as more groups within a state are 
dva “at risk.”  A  the MAR c minute 
 the numbe ties at risk lo hin a state wi o an increase 
in militarized interstate disputes.  The measurement of state power, the state capabilities 
variable, signifies that states will resort to external conflict as a method to enhance their 
change variable that analyzes minor to severe regime changes.  Including the regime 
change variable in the data set does not significantly alter the overall performance
model, according the Wald chi2 goodness of fit test.  The variable returns results 
suggesting that a state’s involvement in militarized interstate disputes will increase with
mild regime changes. 
 As Table 6-10 depicts, evidence is attained to support the institutional threshold 
theory through the assessment of the institutional index.  The index returns significant 
findings indicating that participation in militarized interstate disputes will lessen as 
political institutions are strengthened.  This verifies the institutional threshold in 
democratic consolidation.  Although the variable is hardly si
ization score implies that a decline in democratization will cause involve
al conflict s not conform nsfield and Snyde ntion that 
democrat mplify conflic
 ict control v  significa
across this chapte  minorities bles genera enoting th
militarized interstat ispute invo
declared to be disa ntaged and ccording to oefficient, 





power.  Numerous con elationships w  rise in MID participation.  
merous allia erships will  cause an up ernal 
d to defending their allies. 
e Series Panel Logit for Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Regime Change Full Model21 
Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
tiguous r ill lead to a
Finally, nu nce memb most likely surge in ext









-.0075051 .004764 -1.58* 
Regime Change -.1690401 .0780227 -2.17** 
 
Minorities at Risk .2621488 .0603328 4.35**** 
 
State Capabilities 174.4398 53.92622 3.23**** 
 




.02483 .0102418 2.41*** 
Constant 
 
-2.37281 .4795719 -4.95**** 
n=  62 cases, 1178 observations 
Wald chi2 = 109.33  
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
g a regime change variable in the model helps generate the best predicted 
probabilities in the chapter.  As Table 6-11 displays, 79% of the total observations are 
correctly predicted, 93% of the no conflict situations, and 42% of the conflict situation 
are accurately predicted.  The model adequately predicts the situations of peace, yet does 
           
 Includin
                                      
countries are used as dichotomous variables – Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, South 
Korea, Thailand, and Turkey.  The country dummy variables are included in the full model and the mode
21 To improve the model, a combination of random and fixed effects regression is used.  The following 
ls 





not predict the conflict situations as well.  Although this may be the result of model 
misspecification, it is a common occurrence to logit analysis. 
Table 6-11. Predicted Outcomes Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Regime Change  
 0 1 Total 
0 799 58 857 
1 186 135 321 
Total 985 193 1178 
  
Only four of the component variables of the institutional index fail to produce 
evidence supporting the institutional threshold theory.  The constraints placed on the 
chief executive, constitutional checks, free and fair elections, and universal suffrage do 
not confirm hypothesized effects.   
Displayed in Table 6-12, openness of executive recruitment implies the need to 
elect the chief executive from the political active population to prevent involvement in 
militarized interstate disputes.  An effective and popularly elected legislature indicates 
the importance of the legislative branch in consolidating democracy and thereby reducing 
participation in external c
A civilian, rather than military controlled government, is vital to democratic 
 and the avoidance of external conflict.  Although not significant, 
tems appear to cause MID involvement more quickly than presidential 
oral systems.  The party legitimacy variable indicates the need to include 
 groups in the political arena in order to consolidate democracy and avoid 
tion in external conflict.  Finally, press freedom is significant in democratic 
onsolidation and the prevention of militarized interstate disputes if it can provide for an 











open debate arena.  oefficien ed with ignificant 
th reases i al perfo e will caus  
milit state dis rall, the  of the r
e allo pport to d for th tutional index and the 
l thresho
 Pa l Log  for Militarize  Interstate Disputes 
Regime Change Institution Variables 
efficient Standard 
Error 
Z Value Wald chi2 
The small c ts associat the statistically s
variables indicate at slight dec n institution rmanc e greater
involvement in arized inter putes.  Ove  inclusion egime 
change variabl ws more su be generate e insti
institutiona ld theory. 





-.0205801 .0180393 -1.14 109.50 
Constraints on the  
Chief Executive 
.0392627 .0495262 0.79 105.53 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
-.0317418 .0334992 -0.95 108.61 
Legislative  
Selection 
-.0338272 .0170488 -1.98** 112.44 
Constitutional 
Checks 
.1770259 .0948967 1.87** 112.75 
Military 
 
-.0647768 .0230741 -2.81*** 115.17 
Electoral System 
 
.0079402 .0274678 0.29 109.07 
Party Legitimacy -.0163493 .0322663 -0.51 106.51 
 
Press Freedom -.0632702 .0349469 -1.81** 110.36 
 
Free and Fair .0077914 .0323735 0.24 106.88
Elections 
 
Universal .0734626 .0921454 0.80 108.31 
Suffrage 
n= 62 cases,  1178 observations      
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test  
 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 











his demonstrates that the 
democratization process does not have to be intrinsically violent and lead to heightened 
conflict.  Rather, since most of the models have strongly significant conflict control 
variables, it suggests t.  Although this 
evidence does not support Mansfield and Snyder, it is positive findings indicating that 
he 
maining data sets return evidence consistent with 
conventional wisdo tization will lead 





investigating the relationship that exists between political institutions, a state’s level of 
democratization, and their mutual result on militarized interstate disputes.  Due to th
restrictions of the data and the necessity to use four different data sets, it is e
draw conclusions across the chapter.  Overall, using militarized interstate disputes as th
dependent variable, this chapter provides only limited support for the institutional 
threshold theory and Mansfield and Snyder’s contention that democratizing states are 
more war prone than any other type of regime.  T
that states are simply reacting to their environmen
states should neither force nor fear democratization 
 Figure 6-1 contains the outputs for the level of democratization indicator for t
entire chapter.  This chart indicates that only the 1974 through 2000 model returns 
evidence consistent with democratization and war literature suggesting that 
democratizing states, or anocracies, are more likely to be involved in conflict than any 
other type of regime.  The three re





Figure 6-1. Level of Democratization Indicator  





























 The performance if the institutional index across the four data sets is presented in
Figure 6-2.  Only two of the four data sets provide evidence indicating that political 
institutions have a vital function in democratic consolidation and the deterrence of 
external conflicts.  Therefore, limited support is generated for the institutional threshold 
theory and the role that institutions play in democratic consolidation and the prevention 
 
f milit
Militarized Interstate Disputes 
o arized interstate disputes. 

































 With the exception of the Entered System Late data set, the models perform well 
overall.  Most of the explanatory power of the models, however, can be attributed to the 
conflict control variables.  Consistent across the chapter is the notion that an increase 
number of minority at risk groups located within a state, more contiguous relationships, 
numerous alliance memberships, and an escalation in the amount of state capabilities all 
will lead to more participation in external conflicts through militarized interstate disputes.   
 As Figure 6-3 displays, because of th variation in the performance of the 
comp
difficult to draw conclusions.  However, some ents can be made.  An open 
ystem
ive representatives, and embracing a 
the 













onent variables of the institutional index across the four different datasets, it is 
 general statem
s  of executive recruitment, constraining the chief executive, maintaining an 
effective legislature, popularly electing the legislat
civilian regime, with a subordinate military, are critical governmental institutions to 
 of democratic consolidation and the pre
note that one similarity throughout the chapter is that the electoral system variable
produced findings indicating that parliamentary, not presidential or hybrid, systems are
more likely to be involved in external conflict.  Regarding the intermediary institution










Figure 6-3. Performance of the Component Variables of the Institutional Index 
















































 Concerning the two hypotheses that were tested in this chapter, only limited 
evidence is attained to confirm either hypothesis.  
H2. States that are making the transition to democracy while establishing strong 
political institutions, as evidenced by a higher institutional index score, are less 
likely to be involved in armed conflict. 
 
 Two of the four data sets produce results consistent with the institutional 
threshold theory providing some evidence to suggest that states must pass through the 
institution threshold prior to democratic consolidation and the prevention of conflict. 
H3. Governmental institutions have a greater positive influence on democratic 
consolidation than intermediary institutions. 
 
 Based upon the findings presented in this chapter, there is minimal indication that 
governmental institutions are more imperative to democratic consolidation and therefore 
the avoidance of conflict.    
 Overall, this chapter did not perform very well.  An explanation for the lack of 











the data sets.  T
conflict as the dependent variable, which accounts for both internal and external in





















Chapter 7 – Armed Conflict 
Introduction 
 This third and final quantitative chapter examines the connection between 
political institutions, the state’s level of democratization, and their combined impac
armed conflict.  This chapter utilizes the Armed Conflict data set as the dependent 
variable which is an expansion upon previous literature.  The Armed Conflict data set 
allows for statistical analyses
t on 
 to be performed on both internal and external conflicts.  





political institutions, as evidenced by a higher institutional index score, are less 
 
consolidation than intermediary institutions. 
Results 
1974 – 2000  
 The first data set to be discussed covers the entire time frame of the dissertation, 
1974 through 2000, but only includes a subset of seventy countries.  The first model to be 
examined, using a time series panel regression, is the full model that includes the 
pter analyzes the statistical significance of the models through the use of a tim
series panel regression that employs a combination of random and fixed estimation 
techniques.  Similar to the previous quantitative chapters, analyses are conducted on the
four data sets – 1974 through 2000, Entered System Late, Rule of Law / Bureaucratic 
Quality, and Regime Change.  Two models are tested for each data set – the f
 institutional variables.  The full model tests the institutional index, while the 
component variables of the institutional index are substituted in the institutional va
models.  Two hypotheses are tested in the chapter: 
H2. States that are making the transition to democracy while establishing strong 
likely to be involved in armed conflict. 








institutional index.  In this model, almost all of the variables are significant in 
determining the level of armed conflict in countries that are making the transition to 
democr
e 
e institutional index performs well as it is significant at the .01 level.  This 
suggest se.  
l threshold 
ning of political institutions is a prerequisite 
to democratic consolidation and validation of the democratic peace.   
Several conflict control variables are used within this model.  The number of 
minority groups at risk is highly significant at .001 indicating that armed conflict 
increases as more groups declared to be minorities at risk are located within that state.  
The strength of the minorities at risk variable is most likely explaining the internal 
conflicts found in the dependent variable.  The only variable that is not significant in the 
model is state capabilities which serves as an ndirect measure of a state’s power.  State 
capabilities can serve to either increase or decrease involvement in armed conflict.  States 
that have higher capabilities will often exert their power through armed conflict in an 
attempt to increase their power.  Alternatively, those states that have reduced capabilities 
will often reso efore more 
acy.  As can be seen by examining Table 7-1, the level of democratization, or the 
Polity 2 score, is significant at the .01 level.  This indicates that as states attempt to 
democratize, armed conflict increases.  At first glance, this looks counter-intuitive 
according to conventional wisdom; however, this supports Mansfield and Snyder’s 
argument that state which are making the transition to democracy are more likely to b
involved in armed conflict.   
Th
s that as the validity of political institutions decrease, armed conflict will increa
This performance of the institutional index lends support for the institutiona
theory.  The results indicate that the strengthe
 i





power.  As previously stated ificant to this 
model; however, it is signed in a negative direction which implies that as a state’s 
apabilities decrease, its involvement in armed conflict will increase.   
The next conflict control variable to be analyzed is contiguity which is significant 
t the .05 level.  Consistent with conflict literature, this variable suggests that more 
ontiguous relationships will lead to an increase in armed conflict.  Alliances, the final 
onflict control variable, can serve to either mitigate or initiate a state’s involvement in 
rmed conflict.  In this instance, alliances is significant at .05 denoting that the more 
a state is invo e more likely that state will be involved in armed 
2 score.  It lends 
nt components of the dissertation – the level of 












alliances lved in, th
conflict. 
Overall, the model performs relatively well according to the R
support for the two importa




















Table 7-1. Time Series Panel Regression for Armed Conflict 
22
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
1974 through 2000 Full Model  
 
Polity 2 .0174156 .0061986 2.81*** 
 
Index -.0041373 .0013574 -3.05*** 
 
Minorities at Risk .1621071 .0350121 4.63**** 
 
State Capabilities -10.08649 10.64065 -0.95 
 




.0070029 .0037442 1.87** 
Constant 
 
.0798842 .1734375 0.46 
n= 70 cases, 1890 observations   
Overall R2
Wald c
o determine which political institutions have an impact on democratic 
consoli ssary to 
e 
institut
 = 0.3365  
hi2 = 137.29       
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
 The next model to be analyzed examines the component variables of the 
institutional index, as opposed to the institutional index in its entirety.  This step is 
necessary t
dation and therefore on the prevention of armed conflict.  It is also nece
determine if there is a difference between governmental and intermediary institutions in 
preventing armed conflict.   
Table 7-2 indicates that the majority of the component variables of th
ional index are significant in fostering democratic consolidation and the 
                                                 
22 To improve the model, a c
countries are used as dichoto
ombination of random and fixed effects regression is used.  The following 
mous variables – Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Kenya, Morocco, 
Myanmar, Nigeria, Philippines, and Sri Lanka.  The country dummy variables are included in the full 





prevent t and 







Constitutional checks, which serves as an indirect measure of a state’s 
constitutional checks and balances, is not sig ular model.  Although 
not significant, the direction of the constitutional checks variable suggests that as 
constitutional 
ion of armed conflict.  Two variables, the openness of executive recruitmen
the constraints placed on the chief executive, are used to test the role of the executive 
branch.  Both variables perform well.  The openness of executive recruitment is highly 
significant at the .001 level suggesting that if the politically active population does not 
have the oppo
e as a result.  The second executive measure, constraints on the chief executive, 
also significant at the .05 level.  As constraints, such as oversight by the legislative
branch or parity with other accountability groups, decrease, this in turn will lead to an 
increase in armed conflict.  The coefficients indicate that a small decrease in the op
of executive recruitment and a reduction in the constraints placed on the chief executive 
will lead to an increase in armed conflict. 
Two variables are used to measure the role of the legislative branch.  An 
ineffective or non-existent legislature serves to increase armed conflict because this type
of legislature cannot exert influence over the executive branch.  Legislative effectiv
and legislative selection are both significant at the .01 level.  Legislative selection 
indicates that as the citizen’s ability to elect the legislature decreases, armed conflic
increase.   
nificant in this partic





The role of th  also not  in th lar model.  However, 
does sug civilian c  the creas
increase
 to p ature, the ystem ble sugge
tary system likely to rmed conflict.  Scholars, namely 
es tems are m  than ntary s o decay 
ey o democ ever, ence to 
four in institutio d it th l, only o rsal 
nt.  It is highly significant at the .001 level which 
ranting suffrage to all elements of the population.  As 
 are denied the right to vote, the level of armed conflict 
 not significant, holding free and fair elections are central 
in democratic consolidation and the m t. 
ocratic consolidation and the 
 
 
e military is  significant is particu
the variable gest that as ontrol over military de es, armed 
conflict will .   
Contrary revious liter  electoral s  varia sts that 
parliamen s are more engage in a
Linz, imply that pr idential sys ore likely  parliame ystems t
or breakdown as th  transition t racy.  How  this model presents evid
the contrary. 
Of the termediary ns analyze e mode ne, unive
suffrage, is statistically significa
demonstrates the importance of g
elements of the population
increases.  Similarly, although
itigation of armed conflic
The remaining intermediary institutions, party legitimacy and press freedom, are 
also not significant.  However, party legitimacy does suggest that excluding opposition 
political parties from participation in the political arena will lead to a rise in armed 
conflict.  Finally, the press freedom variable produces counter-intuitive results suggesting 
that press freedom is not a critical component of dem









Table 7-2. Time Series Panel Regression for Armed Conflict 
Variable Coefficient Standard Z Value 




Openness of Exec. -.0234875 .0054876 -4.28**** 0.3383 
Recruitment 
Constraints on the  -.0220498 .0115673 -1.91** 0.3273 
Chief Executive 




L tive  -.0128473 .0047708 -2.69*** 0.3336 egisla
Selection 




-.0029637 .0064057 -0.46 0.3290 
Electoral System 
 
.0132389 .0072986 1.81** 0.3279 
Party Legitimacy 
 
-.0078162 .0067086 -1.17 0.3311 
Press Freedom 
 
.0097309 .0082195 1.18 0.3255 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
-.0083773 .006859 -1.22 0.3256 
Universal Suffrage 
 
-.0763261 .0146802 -5.20**** 0.3455 
n=70 cases,  1890 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
Entered System Late 
 The Entered System Late data set produces slightly different results than the 1974 
through 2000 data set.  This data set includes those states that entered the international 
system after 1974.  All countries of interest to the dissertation are analyzed within this 
data set; howev verall, the 
model performs well with an R2 score of .40. 
 





 lts presente 3 sugge ocratizat tor 
rticular model is not significant.  It does suggest that as the level of 
atization decrea conflict wil  This is cons
m, but does not support M d Snyder’s p t 
s ar ly to be inv ed conflict
rimary inte issertation tional index ms well.  It is 
 significant at .001.  Once again, th nal index indicates that as the 
ce of politic ecrease, flict will inc
ariable s heavily significant indicating that armed conflict 
 be at risk.  The 
 variables perform differently than the previous model.  The 
t statistically significant.  The variable signifies that as 
 
ntiguous relationships decrease.  Finally, the 
The resu d in Table 7- st the level of dem ion indica
in this pa
democr ses, armed l increase. istent with 
conventional wisdo ansfield an remise tha
democratizing state e more like olved in arm . 
 Of p rest to this d , the institu  perfor
statistically e institutio
performan al institutions d  armed con rease.   
 The minorities at risk v  i
will increase with the number of groups within a country declared to
remaining conflict control
state capabilities variable is no
state capabilities increase, armed conflict will also increase.  Although not statistically
significant, the contiguity variable returns counter-intuitive results, suggesting that armed 
conflict will increase as the number of co
alliances variable signifies the importance of allying with other states in thwarting armed 
conflict. The significant results suggest that armed conflict increases as a state’s 















Table 7-3. Time Series Panel Regression for Armed Conflict  
23
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
Entered System Late Full Model  
 
Polity 2 -.0015649 .0108539 -0.14 
 
Index -.0081108 .0023222 -3.49**** 
 
Minorities at Risk .1270321 .0276274 4.60**** 
 




-.0143045 .0207986 -0.69 
A es 
 
-.0072796 .0043336 -1.68** llianc
Constant 
 
.9023744 .2121959 4.25**** 
n= 87 cases, 870 observations  
Overall R2 = 0.4046  
Wald chi2 = 211.70       
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
 Table 7-4 presents the results for the mponent variables of the institutional 
index for the Entered System Late data set.  Overall, these models perform relatively well 
with R2 scores ranging from .37 to .40.   
 Of the eleven component variables analyzed, six generate significant results.  The 
significance of the openness of executive recruitment variable suggests that armed 
conflict will increase if the politically active population is denied access to compete for 
the chief executive.  Both legislative effectiveness and legislative selection are highly 
significant sig gislative 
                                        
co
nifying th elected lee importance of an effective and popularly 
         
23 l n of random fects used.  ng 
ables – Alg a, Guate ia, Peru nes, 
l, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.  The country dummy variables are included in the full model and 
the models for the institutional variables. 
 To improve the mode
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Table 7-4. Time Series Panel Regression for Armed Conflict 
Variable Coefficient Standard Z Value Overall R2 
Entered System Late Institution Variables 
 Error  
Openness of Exec. -.0260979 .009799 -2.66*** 0.3893 
Recruitment 




.0169428 -3.23**** 0.3997 
L tive  -.0325949 .0100329 -3.25**** 0.4026 egisla
Selection 




-.0008942 .0121472 -0.07 0.3798 
Electoral System 
 
.0082799 .0120017 0.69 0.3781 




-.0002851 .0103796 -0.03 0.3791 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
-.0026006 .0099109 -0.26 0.3786 
Universal Suffrage 
 
-2.2263483 .0411516 -5.50**** 0.3922 
n= 87 cases, 870 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
Rule of Law, Bureaucratic Quality 
Tables 7-5 and 7-6 present the results or the rule of law, bureaucratic quality data 
set.  The two most important variables to this dissertation, the level of democratization 
and the institutional index, receive overwhelming support from this data set.  The level of 
democratization ind ing 
support for Mansfield and Snyder’s argument that democratizing states are more war 
prone than either democratic or authoritarian states.  The institutional threshold theory, 
 
 f





which sted throu onal in ingly sig
 the importanc al institution ocess of dem
dation and the m  armed con inclusion of aw and 
 va ngly influence the significance leve titutional 
ient el of democratization and the insti l index imply 
move towa racy will lea rmed confli as a minor 
 the perform e component variables of the institutional index will 
 rise in armed
ious data sets, the minority at risk variable returns 
pting armed 
lliances are both significant in the positive direction indicating 









 is being te gh the instituti dex, is overwhelm nificant 
denoting e of politic s in the pr ocratic 
consoli itigation of flict.  The the rule of l
bureaucratic quality riables stro l of the ins
index.  The coeffic s for the lev tutiona
that a small rds democ d to more a ct, where
decrease in ance of th
produce a  conflict. 
 As consistent with prev
significant results that stress the importance of at risk groups in prom
conflict.  Contiguity and a
that contiguous relationships a
c t.  The only variable that fails to produce significant results is state capabilit
 This model performs well overall with an R score suggesting that approximately 
forty-four percent of the variation in the data is being explained.  The incorporation of the
rule of law and bureaucratic quality variables improves the model specification.  
However, the data is not available for all countries and years.  Th











Table 7-5. Time Series Panel Regression for Armed Conflict 
24
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
Rule of Law / Bureaucratic Quality Full Model  
 
Polity 2 .0300001 .0083959 3.57**** 
 
Index -.0138247 .0019751 -7.00**** 
 
Minorities at Risk .1231584 .0360216 3.42**** 
 







.0082713 .0055045 1.50* llianc
Constant 
 
.8780968 .2618564 3.35**** 
n= 62 cases, 992 observations  
Overall R  = 0.4381 
Wald chi2 = 156.56       
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
 
 By examining the R2 scores, it is clear that the component variables of the 
institutional index for the rule of the law, bureaucratic quality data set perform well.  Th
R2 scores range 
2
e 
from .37 to .43 with the rule of law and bureaucratic quality component 
 Similar to the previous models, the openness of executive recruitment, legislative 
effectiveness, and legislative selection return highly significant results, once again 
                       
variables receiving the highest scores lending further evidence for their necessity in 
democratic consolidation and the prevention of armed conflict.   
                          
24 To improve the m e following 
countries are used a , Peru, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Africa.  The country dummy variables are included in the full model and the 
models for the institutional variables. 
 
odel, a combination of random and fixed effects regression is used.  Th
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lt citiz oting pro rary t us models, the role of 
result sug t a m rnm hich 
ed conflict.  Also inconsistent 
 free and fair elections variable is significant specifying the 
ns in the consolidation of democracy and the avoidance of 
armed conflict. 
 Constraints on the chief executive, constitutional checks, the type of electoral 
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democratic consolid tion and the  passivity  democratic ce.   
 New to this data set, the r  and burea tic qua bles both
overwhelmin ificant resu g evidence e need of a l establis
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significance of le of law v icates that ack of ourt syst
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do not ha rious and pr lized burea y to imple
will also experienc an increase conflict.   
 Party legiti acy once aga s a signific sult indica he lack o
exclusion of p l parties may n increase i ed conflict. nsistent with 
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include all adu ens in the v cess.  Cont o previo
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Table 7-6. Time Series Panel Regression for Armed Conflict 
Variable Coefficient Standard Z Value Overall R2 
Rule of Law / Bureaucratic Quality Institution Variables 
 Error  
Openness of Exec. -.0329423 .0086144 -3.82**** 0.3944 
Recruitment 
Constraints on the  -.0061623 .0157761 -0.39 0.3731 
Chief Executive 
Legislative -.0585286 .0143817 -4.07**** 0.3920 
Effectiveness 
Legislative  -.0444929 .0075581 -5.89**** 0.4047 
Selection 
Constitutional .0054455 .0270276 0.20 0.3714 
Checks 
Rule of Law 
 
-.1189541 .0121987 -9.75**** 0.4308 
Military 
 
-.0272123 .0103097 -2.64*** 0.3968 
Electoral System .0021529 
 
.0107498 0.20 0.3719 
Party Legitimacy 
 
-.0223637 .0091546 -2.44*** 0.3893 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
-.0956131 .0185054 -5.17**** 0.4114 
Press Freedom 
 
.004568 .0108957 0.42 0.3700 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
-.0149516 .0092542 -1.62* 0.3706 
Universal Suffrage 
 
-.2466771 .0338561 -7.29**** 0.3935 
n=62 cases,  992 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed test 
Regime Change 
 The final data set to be analyzed on the armed conflict dependent variable is the 
regime change data set.  These results can be found in Tables 7-7 and 7-8.  Although not 
significant itself, the inclusion of the regime change variable bolsters the significance 






indicator is heavily significan ence for Mansfield and 
Snyder’s contradictory premise to the democratic peace.  All four of the conflict control 
ariables are significant in this particular model.  The minorities at risk variable provides 
rther evidence that disadvantaged and discriminated groups are likely to lead to an 
crease in armed conflict.  The measure of a state’s power, state capabilities, produces 
egative results indicating that states will resort to armed conflict when they are seeing a 
ecline in their power status.  The contiguity variable returns results consistent with 
onventional wisdom suggesting that more contiguous relationships will lead to more 
lict.  The final conf trol variable,
g that the more alliances a state is involved in, the more likely that state will be 
the model, it does not strengthen the score of the institutional 
sted in this chapter, the institutional index returns the least 
ignific
ore 
ls of armed conflict. 
 This model does not perform as well as the previous, with an R2 score of .25.  The 
regime change data was not available for all ates or years of interest to this dissertation.  
Therefore, ana 1974 
through 1992. 







armed conf lict con  alliances, again returns results 
suggestin
drawn into an armed conflict.   
 Although the inclusion of the regime change variable bolsters the significance 
levels of other variables in 
index.  Of the four data sets te
s ant results in the regime change data set.  It is, however, still statistically 
significant, offering evidence for the necessity of consolidating governmental and 
intermediary institutions in the process of preventing armed conflict.  Finally, the regime 
change variable is not significant, however it does produce results indicating that m
dramatic, anti-system regime changes will lead to heightened leve
st





Table 7-7. T d Conflict 
 Change Full Model  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 





.0430355 .008021 5.37**** 
Index 
 
-.0025856 .0015498 -1.67** 
Regime Change .0225433 .0201678 1.12 
 
Minorities at Risk .1763498 .0435799 4.05**** 
 
State Capabilities -41.12137 18.19713 -2.26** 
 
Contiguity .0781765 .0295991 2.64*** 
 
Alliances .0060183 .0045767 1.31* 
 
Constant .0183414 .2249147 0.08 
 
n= 62 cases, 1178 observations   
.2589 
= 98.51       
t
*p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
test 
ange in the models for the component variables of the 
institutional index does not furnish many significant results.  In fact, only two variables, 
legislative effectiveness and party legitimacy, are statistically significant.  The remaining 
component variables do not return significant results because the conflict control 
variables explain the instances of armed conflict in the models.   
 
 
                                                
Overall R2 = 0
Wald chi2 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed est 
*
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
****p ≤ .001, one-tailed 
 





el and the models for the institutional variables. 
25 To improve the model, a combination of random and fixed effects regression is used.  The following
countries are used as dichotomous variables – Guatemala, Morocco, and Philippines.  The country dummy 






Table 7-8. Time Series Panel Regression For Armed Conflict 
Variable Coefficient Standard Z Value Overall R2




Openness of Exec. -.007116 .0065805 -1.08 0.255
Recruitment 
5 
Constraints on the  -.0168602 .0149388 -1.13 0.2568 
Chief Executive 
Legislative -.0320112 .0103695 -3.09**** 0.2664 
Effectiveness 
Legislative  -.0013062 .0051316 -0.25 0.2501 
Selection 




-.0043923 .0075198 -0.58 0.2525 






0.2692 -.0440002 .0096023 -4.58**** 
Press Freedom 
 
.0030979 .0119885 0.26 0.2476 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
-.0033163 .0094465 -0.35 0.2488 
Universal Suffrage 
 
-.0045128 .0177676 -0.25 0.2493 
n=62 cases,  1178 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 






 The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the relationship between po
institutions, a state’s level of democratization, and their collective affect on armed 
conflict.  Because of data limitations and the need to use four different data sets, it is 
important to draw conclusions across the chapter.  As a whole, this chapter provides great 





democratization and the institutional index, which provides the means for testing the 
institutional threshold theory. 
 As can be seen by examining Figure 7-1, in three of the four models, the level of 
democratization var war literature.  




Armed Conflict  
iable provides support for the democratization and 
a tion to the democratic peace, suggesting that states making the transition to 
democracy are more war prone, both internally and externally, than either democrati
authoritarian states.  This empirical evidence provides support for Mansfield and 
Snyder’s claim that the transition process to democracy is inherently violent.  It can also 
be concluded that new and transitional democracies are unstable, which undermines
validates the principles associated with the democratic peace.   


























 Using armed conflict as the dependent variable, the institutional index also 
receives overwhelm
nal 
threshold theory.  States that are able to strengthen a majority of their political institutions 
ing support from this chapter.  The institutional index is significant in 





will pass through the institutional threshold proceeding toward democratic conso
and therefore the validation of the democratic peace and the passivity that exists am
democracies.  It is imperative to strengthen political institutions.  A lack of institutio
strengthening means the state is at risk of becoming an entrenched anocracy and 




d risk for armed conflict.  
Armed Conflict  


























 The conflict control variables perform lative similarity across all data sets.  
In all four data sets, the minority at risk variable is highly significant indicating the 
impor
number of at risk groups are at a high conflict.  The performance of state 
capabilities varies across the four data sets.  This is not surprising considering that 
possessing an abundance or a scarcity of capabilities can lead involvement in armed 
conflict.  Possessing an abundance of capabilities will lead states to exert their influence 
in the international system as they hope to gain more power.  Those states with a scarcity 
of capabilities will make an effort to increase their power, through armed conflict if 
necessary.   
 with re
tance of preventing groups from becom ng “at risk.”  States that include a large i





Remaining consistent with conflict literature in three of the four data sets, the 
contiguity variable returns results suggesting that possessing a large quantity of 
contiguous relationships will lead to an increase in armed conflict.  Although alliances 
can serve to either mitigate or initiate a state’s involvement in armed conflict, this chapter 
produces evidence indicating that higher alliance membership can actually lead to an 
increase in armed conflict. 
Figure 7-3 indicates that the component variables of the institutional index 
perform with relative similarity across all data sets.  The component variables can be 
broken into two categories – those that consistently produce significant results, 












conflict, and those component variables that fail to consistently produce signific
results, signifying their role in democratic consolidation and the prevention of armed 
t is secondary.   
The openness of executive recruitment, legislative effectiveness, legislative 
selection, the rule of law, party legitimacy, bureaucratic quality, and universal suffra
are essential in democratic consolidation and the avoidance of armed conflict.  Althou
not underscoring the importance of these po
the chief executive, constitutional checks, the role of the military, the type of electo
system, press freedom, and free and fair elections are secondary to the proces









Figure 7-3. Performance of the Component Variables of the Institutional Index 











































































 Two hypotheses were tested in this c ed below. 
  
H2. States that are making the transition to democracy while establishing strong 
political institutions, as evidenced by a higher institutional index score, are less 
likely to be involved in armed conflict. 
 
 There is strong empirical evidence to uggest that this hypothesis is correct.  
Political institutions serve as a mitigating factor in the prevention of armed conflict 
because they allow democratic consolidation to occur and they serve as a regulating 
mechanism on elites and the masses alike. 
 States must pass through the institutional threshold before they are able to 
consolidate democracy and reduce the conflict levels that are inherent in the 
democratization process.  If stat nstitutions, and therefore 
consolidate democracy, they will lessen the amount of time spent in the democratization 
 
hapter.  They are review
 s





process, thereby reducing the inherently dangerous and disruptive behavior that 
accompanies this process.  
H3. Governmental institutions have a greater positive influence on democratic 
 
consolidation than intermediary institutions. 
 Hypothesis two asks for a preference to be given between governmental and 
intermediary institutions.  This chapter presents evidence to suggest that both 
governmental and intermediary institutions are important to the process of democratic 
consolidation and the deterrence of armed conflict.   
 Overall, this chapter returns evidence indicating that Mansfield and Snyder are 
correct in their assertion that democratizing states are more war prone that other types of 
regimes.  However, this is less of a concern because the institutional threshold theory 
provides the template for generating democratic consolidation and consequently the 


























Chapter 8 – Conclusions 






 no.  Based upon the findings of the democratic 
peace, 
ace.  
n not the 
the democratic peace with the pessimism of the democratization and war literature by 
discovering the necessary and sufficient political institutions needed to consolidate 
democracy and thus authenticate the democratic peace.  To reach this objective, several 
research questions and hypotheses were tested throughout the quantitative chapters of 
dissertation.  Due to the fact that this dissertation deals with developing countries across a
lengthy time frame, it is not surprising that some variables are limited.  As a result of 
these limitations, four different data sets are used across three quantitative chapters.  
Therefore, it is necessary to draw conclusions across the dissertation and summarize th
information by answering the research questions and related hypotheses.  This 
information provides a template concerning the critical political institutions that foste
democratic consolidation and in turn validate the democratic peace. 
Examination of Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Does the proliferation of democracy really contribute to world peace?  The 
answer to this question is both yes and
politicians and policy-makers have adopted a foreign policy strategy that involves 
the promotion of democracy.  Democracy promotion does contribute to world peace 
when mature, liberal democracies are added to the international community.  This type of 
regime possesses the necessary political institutions that validate the democratic pe
However, mature democracies, upon which the democratic peace relies, are ofte





democracy promotion.  This type of state undermines, not validates, the democratic 
peace. 
Is democracy promotion a valuable policy tool to ensure world peace, or a
policy-makers inadvertently advancing conflict 
re the 





evidence to support motion of 
democracy should neither b  does find supporting 
evidence for Mansfield and
states disintegrate from within an fects leading to conflict.  
Therefore, it can be reasoned that her than democratization that 
produce conflict in these situations.   
Which political institutions are neces ry to ensure democratic consolidation and 
by extension prevent armed conflict through the validation of the democratic peace?  The 
primary objective of this disserta litical institutions 
to the process of democratic consoli gs indicate that all thirteen 
component variables of the institutional index play a critical role in democratic 
gh some evidence was found to support Mansfield and Snyder, this dissertation 
finds that they have somewhat overstated their contradictory premise to the democratic 
peace when they imply that democratizing states are more war prone, both internal
externally, than any either democratic or authoritarian regimes.  The two quantitative 
tests of this premise return somewhat contradictory findings.  Different results are foun
in Chapter Six, which uses militarized interstate disputes to test external conflict as the 
dependent variable, and Chapter Seven, which employs Armed Conflict to test both 
internal and external conflict as the dependent variable.  Chapter Six peo
Mansfield and Snyder, which indicates that the pro
e for venced nor feared.  Chapter Se
 Snyder’s assertion.  However, it may also be argued that 
d this often has spillover ef
there may be causes ot
sa
tion has been to identify the critical po





consolidation.  Although it is possible aller number of highly critical 
institutions, the results suggest tha function of “lynch pin” 
institutions.  Democratic consolidation rests upon the strengthening of these thirteen 
political institutions.  When dem cting their template for 
democratic consolidation, they m acy of these political 
institutions. 
Elevating some ins le that the institution 
plays in fostering democratic consoli lt, but possible.  Table 8.1 portrays 
the rank order of governmental in vides the ranking of the 
intermediary institutions, and Table itioning of all thirteen political 
institutions26.  As the tables indicate, c he chief executive and legislative 
effectiveness are the key governme reas free and fair elections and 
party le sed that 
Constraints on the Chief Executive 
 to identify a sm
t all thirteen serve the 
ocratizing states are constru
ust acknowledge the prim
titutions over others, in terms of the ro
dation, is difficu
stitutions, Table 8.2 pro
8.3 reveals the pos
onstraints on t
ntal institutions, whe
gitimacy are the vital intermediary institutions.  However, it must be stres
all thirteen political institutions are critical to democratic consolidation. 
Table 8.1 Ranking of Governmental Institutions 
Legislative Effectiveness 





Rule of Law 
 
 




26 The ranking mechanism for the institutions can be found in Appendix 6.  The significance level for each 
institution for each model across the three quantitative chapters was added together and then divided by the 





Table 8.2 Ranking of Intermediary Institutions 






Table 8.3 Ranking of Both Governmental and  
Intermediary Institutions 
Constraints on the Chief Executive 
Free and Fair Elections 
Party Legitimacy 
Legislative Effectiveness 










overnmental institutions and intermediary 
stitutions in democratic consolidation and the prevention of armed conflict?  The 
mple answer to this research questions is no.  Intermediary institutions, or those 
stitutions that act as a conduit between the citizens and the state, are equally as 
portant to democratic consolidation as governmental institutions, or those institutions 
at hold the formal powers of the government.  Based upon the findings of the three 
institut rmediary institutions during the process of 






quantitative chapters, minute evidence is acquired to suggest that governmental 







ficance generated in the quantitative 
s.  
States n ns as a prerequisite to democratic 
their 
nd the literacy rate.  This indicates that 
itizenry will be more likely to consolidate democracy and validate the passivity and 







atic consolidation.  This indicates that both governmental and intermediary 
institutions should be strengthened as a means to consolidate democracy. 
Similar to the threshold that exists for the gross national product and literacy 
rates, is there an institutional threshold necessary for states to democratize?  The 
institutional threshold theory was tested in the three quantitative chapters through t
institutional index.  Based upon the statistical signi
chapters, it can be concluded that a threshold effect does exist for political institution
eed to strengthen their political institutio
consolidation.  This provides support for the institutional threshold theory suggesting that 
states must make a conscious effort during the democratizing process to strengthen 
political institutions.  This strengthening of political institutions will provide for 
democratic consolidation and in turn validate the democratic peace. 
Evidence is found in Chapter Five to further support the idea that a threshold 
effect exists regarding gross national product a










H1. States that are making the tr cy while establishing strong 
political institutions, as evidenced by a higher institutional index score, are more 
 
e 
political institutions, as evidenced by a higher institutional index score, are less 
 
 support for 
the institutional threshold theory bec itutions serve as a mitigating factor 
 the p
intermediary institutions. 
Although this dissertation differentiates between governmental and intermediary 
institutions, the findings from the three quantitative chapters do not suggest that 
governmental institutions are more important than intermediary institutions in the process 
of democratic consolidation.  Strengthening of the thirteen political institutions is 
necessary for democratic consolidation to occur.  Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is rejected. 
 
ansition to democra
likely to consolidate democracy. 
Hypothesis 1 tests the first part of the two-stage analysis by examining the effect 
that institutions have on democratic consolidation.  Chapter Five provides strong 
empirical evidence to suggest that Hypothesis 1 is correct.  States that have focused on 
regime reforms, through strengthening their political institutions, are more likely to 
consolidate democracy.  Once democracy is consolidated, these states possess th
characteristics that validate the democratic peace. 
H2. States that are making the transition to democracy while establishing strong 
likely to be involved in armed conflict. 
 Hypothesis 2 tests the second stage of analysis by examining political institutions, 
the level of democratization, and their impact on conflict.  Chapters Six and Seven 
produce findings to suggest that this hypothesis is also correct.  This provides
ause political inst
in revention of armed conflict, they allow for democratic consolidation, and they 
serve as a regulating mechanism on behavior. 







Although several important contributions, such as the institutional threshold 
theory and the operationalization of political institutions through the institutional index, 
ave been added to the international relations and comparative politics literature as a 
sult of this dissertation, there are several issues that remain unresolved that need to be 
addressed in future research.  First, using mo  advanced quantitative methods, is it 
possible to temporally test the order of establishing and strengthening political 
institutions?  Second, are there better measures for the component variables of the 
institutional index?  Third, future research should qualitatively examine the institutional 
threshold theory through the case study techn que.  Finally, this dissertation’s focus 
concentrates on the state level of analysis through an examination of political institutions.  
Logical follow-up studies include analyzing the effects of the systemic and individual 
levels of analysis on countries that are making the transition to democracy.   
Final Remarks 
 
 Because the United States, other Wes ocracies, and intergovernmental 
organizations, such as the United Nations, see democracy as a prescription for peace, the 
promotion of democracy promises to be a continuing foreign policy priority.  Therefore, 
the international community must be very pr ise in promoting mature, liberal, 
consolidated democracy and wary of other forms of democracy, such as 
pseudodemocracy, authoritarian democracy, electoral democracy, etc., that may deliver 
less than desirable outcomes.   
When democracy is described in the porary world, it is described “with 












mature, liberal, consolidated democra seudodemocracy, semi-democracy, 
illiberal democracy, author  electoral democracy, and 
so on.  
 
 
cy, rather than p









































Appendix 1 –  

































































Azerbaijan Cameroon Algeria Albania Brazil 
Myanmar Congo 
Brazzaville 
Angola Armenia Chile 
 Egypt  Burkina Faso Bangladesh Croatia 
 Equatorial 
Guinea 
Burundi Benin Dominican 
Republic 
 Gabon Cambodia Central African 
Republic 
El Salvador 
 Gambia Chad Ecuador Guatemala 
 Kazakhstan Comoros Estonia Honduras 
 Kyrgyzstan Djibouti Fiji Madagascar 
 Mauritania Ethiopia Georgia Mexico 
 Morocco Ghana Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua 
 Pakistan Guinea Guyana Panama 
 Rwanda Iran Ivory Coast Paraguay 
 Uganda Jordan Macedonia Philippines 
 Zimbabwe Kenya Mali Poland 
  Liberia Mozambique Romania 
  Malaysia Namibia Russia 
  Peru Nepal Senegal 
  Sierra L Niger South Africa eone 
  Singapore Nigeria South Korea 
  Somalia Sri Lanka Spain 
  Tajikistan  Taiwan 
  Tanzania  Thailand 
  Togo  Turkey 
  Tunisia  Ukraine 
  Yemen  Yugoslavia 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variable Explanation Original Recoded 
 
Openness  Unregulated 
Power Transfers 
0 0 
of Closed System 1 0 
 
Executive Dual Executive – 
Designation 
2 4 
Recruitment Dual Executive – 
Election 
3 8 










Unlimited 1 0 
Constraints 
Category 
Intermediate 2 0 


















Variable Explanation Original Recoded 
 
Legislative  None 
 
0 0 













Variable Explanation Original Recoded 
 
Legislative  None 
 
0 0 
Selection 1 6 Nonelective 
 




Vari ble E Original Recoded 
 
a xplanation 
Rule Depend on 
Physical 
0 0 
of  Force or Illegal 
 
1 2 
Law Means to  
 
2 4 





 Institutions to  
 
5 10 
 Implem Laws 
 
6 12 ent 
 
 
Variable Original Explanation Recoded 
 
Bureaucratic 0 0 Patronage 
 
Quality 1 2  
 
  2 4 
 
  3 6 
 













Variable Explanation Original Recoded 
 











 E  
Excluded 
xtremist Parties 2 8 






E Original Recoded 
 
Variable xplanation 
Type  Civilian  
 
1 12 
of  Military-Civilian 
 
2 6 
Regime Military 3 0 
 





V Original Recoded 
 
ariable Explanation 




Freedom Unable to Function 
as a Debate Arena  
3 4 
















Variable Explanation Original Recoded 
 
Electoral  Unelected 
Executives 















Variable Explanation Original Recoded 
 
Free and Fair  Elections Are 
Not Free and Fair
0 0 
Elections Elections Are 





Variable Explanation Original Recoded 
 
Universal Suffrage Not 











































































1974 through 2000 
Table 1. Panel R r Full
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 




.0561664 .0023159 24.25**** 
GNP per capita 
 
.0000406 .0000273 1.49* 
Literacy  
 
.0106652 .004455 2.39*** 
Colonial Legacy -.7477462 .4138664 -1.81** 
 
Religion 1.051311 .5971136 1.76** 
 
Minorities at Risk -.1477894 .0856262 -1.73** 
 
Constant 1.719861 .3567508 4.82**** 
 
n=70 cases, 1680 observations 
974 
p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
tailed 























Overall R2 = 0.4
*
**p ≤ .05, one-
***p ≤ .01
test 






Table 2. Panel Regression For Institution Variables 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Z Value Overall R2 
Error 
Openness of Exec. 
Recruitment 
.1608 151527  0.2521 208 .0  10.61****
Constraints on the  
hief Executive 
. .01600 3.69****  
C
379082 3 2 0.4903
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
. .02071 0.74**** 78 4298082 98 2 0.40
Legislative  
election 
. .01380 0.47**** 1 
S
1445622 52 1 0.274
Constitutional 
Checks 
. .04893 2.97****  6344422 28 1 0.3473
Military 
 
. .01824 1.13****  2031477 67 1 0.2567
Electoral System 
 
. .01993 .12**** 80 1818465 73 9 0.26
Party Legitimacy . .01391 2.62****  
 
3147359 12 2 0.4332
Press Freedom .3831943
 
 .0199323 19.22**** 0.4576 
Free and Fair .23
Elections 
3792 .0135732 17.22**** 0.3945 
Universal Suffrage .2287
 
794 .0450789 5.08**** 0.2028 
n=70 cases, 1680 observations 
p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
*p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 























Entered System Late 
 
Table 3. Panel Regression for Full Model 
ficien tanda e Variable 
 
Coef t S rd Error Z Valu
Index 
 
.0345615 43915 7.87.00  **** 
GNP per cap
 
ita  00465 2.21.0001028 .00  ** 
Literacy  
 
.0174714 71298 2.45.00  *** 
Colonial Legac
 
y 6 37114 -3.22**** -1.62102 .50  
Religion 
 
3.085733 12507 4.60.67  **** 
Minorities at Risk  51471 -2.11** 
 
-.2007146 .09  
Constant 
 





























*p ≤ .10, one-t
**p ≤ .05, 
st 









Table 4. Panel Regression For Institution Variables 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Z Value Overall R2 
Error 
Openness of Exec. 
Recruitment 
.0956 252381 0.3294 361 .0  3.79**** 
Constraints on the  
hief Executive 
. .03074 .50**** 
C
2304795 63 7 0.5158 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
. .04111 .82**** 4395 2392625 47 5 0.
Legislative  
election 
.  .02439 .92**** 8 
S
0956722 37 3 0.307
Constitutional 
Checks 
.178426 .0616341 .89*** 8 2 0.329
Military 
 






Party Legitimacy . .02067 .92*** 9 
 
060341 5 2 0.309
Press Freedom .0405532
 
 .020213 2.01** 0.3090 
Free and Fair .10
Elections 
31594 .0191857 5.38**** 0.4049 
Universal Suffrage .0987
 
12 .0784731 1.26 0.2707 
n=87 cases, 609 observations 
p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
*p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
























Rule of Law, Bureaucratic Quality 
 
Table 5. Panel Regression for Full Model 
ficien tanda e Variable 
 
Coef t S rd Error Z Valu
Index 
 
.0553772 38599 14.3.00  5**** 
GNP per cap
 
ita  00394 -0.16 -.0000629 .00  
Literacy  
 
.01495 .0064127 2.33***  
Colonial Legac
 
y  51077 -2.56*** -1.139053 .44  
Religion 
 
1.529027 80115 2.29.66  ** 





1.417768 88604 2.79.50  *** 
n=62 cases, 806 ob
2
se
verall R  = 0.5100 
tailed te
, one-tailed test 
tailed




















*p ≤ .10, one-
**p ≤ .05
st 










Table 6. Panel Regression For Institution Variables 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Z Value Overall R2 
Error 
Openness of Exec. 
Recruitment 
.1620 260845 0.2890 705 .0  6.21**** 
Constraints on the  
hief Executive 





. .03696 2.24**** 4 4524383 39 1 0.447
Legislative  
election 
. .02609 .40**** 2 
S
1408657 89 5 0.3124
Constitutional 
Checks 
. .07738 .69**** 3934 5174379 61 6 0.
Rule of Law . .04370 .92** .2918 
 
0837933 14 1 0
Military 
 
. .03212 .06**** 3216 2267066 64 7 0.
Electoral System .154191 .0329904 .67**** 54 
 
4 0.32
Party Legitimacy . .02110 4.25****  
 
3007369 22 1 0.4715
Bureaucratic .1171323
Quality 
 .0624065 1.88** .02902 
Press Freedom .31
 
28338 .0314452 9.95**** 0.4495 
Free and Fair .1918
Elections 
245 .019883 9.65**** 0.4476 
Universal Suffrage 
 
.4289599 .1135464 3.78**** 0.2533 
n=62 cases, 806 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 



















Table 7. Panel Regression for Full Model 
ficien tanda e Variable 
 
Coef t S rd Error Z Valu
Index 
 
.0344854 30823 11.1.00  9**** 
GNP per cap
 
ita  00736 2.50.0001843 .00  *** 
Literacy  
 
.0282307 59774 4.72.00  **** 
Colonial Legac
 
y  62044 -0.68 -2.961896 .43  
Religion 
 
.1462182 23782 0.23.64   
Minorities at Risk  69919 -1.13 
 
-.1100441 .09  
Regime Change 
 
.1033301 59161 2.25.04  **  
Constant 
 




 = 0.4269 
te






















*p ≤ .10, one-tailed st 
*
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 










Z Value Overall R2 
Openness of Exec. 
Recruitment 
.0781652 .0179569 4.35**** 0.2553 
Constraints on the  
Chief Executive 
.2551669 .0229902 11.10**** 0.4268 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
.2836623 .0250866 11.31**** 0.3657 
Legislative  
Selection 
.0896528 .0143986 6.23**** 0.2488 
Constitutional 
Checks 
.1469733 .0700834 2.10** 0.2555 
Military 
 
.1324287 .0204601 6.47**** 0.2577 
Electoral System 
 
.1122481 .0232638 4.83**** 0.2655 
Party Legitimacy 
 
.2993573 .0235665 12.70**** 0.4761 
Press Freedom 
 
.3459607 .0305569 11.32**** 0.4704 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
.140135 .01972 7.11**** 0.3483 
Universal Suffrage 
 
-.0444234 .0506363 -0.88 0.2228 
n=62 cases, 992 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 








































































1974 – 2000 
 
Table 1. Panel Regression for Full Model 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
Index 
 
.0041566    .0019705 2.11** 
GNP per capita 
 
-.000016 .0000212 -0.76 
Literacy  
 
.0011249 .0022538 0.50 
Colonial Legacy 
 
-.3486968 .1236421 -2.82*** 
Religion 
 
.0998075 .1800844 0.55 
Minorities at Risk 
 
.0092781 .0257495 0.36 
Constant 
 
.0315741 .1493153 0.21 
n=70 cases, 1890 observations 
Overall R2 = 0.0079 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 































Z Value Overall R2 
Openness of Exec. 
Recruitment 
.0240752 .0098255 2.45*** 0.0087 
Constraints on the  
Chief Executive 
.066124 .0132998 4.97**** 0.0184 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
.0265524 .0165516 1.60* 0.0069 
Legislative  
Selection 
.0058492 .0109008 0.54 0.0019 
Constitutional 
Checks 
-.1981179 .0384737 -5.15**** 0.0193 
Military 
 
.0429357 .0133244 3.22**** 0.0110 
Electoral System 
 
-.0592533 .0128164 -4.62**** 0.0167 
Party Legitimacy 
 
.0346402 .0120471 2.88*** 0.0099 
Press Freedom 
 
-.005551 .0137273 -0.40 0.0056 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
.0352679 .0102254 3.45**** 0.0118 
Universal Suffrage 
 
.0076982 .0290132 0.27 0.0056 
n=70 cases, 1890 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 





















Entered System Late 
 
Table 3. Panel Regression for Full Model 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
Index 
 
.0041312 .0034614 1.19 
GNP per capita 
 
.00000352 .0000246 0.14 
Literacy  
 
-.0085729 .0035964 -2.38*** 
Colonial Legacy 
 
-.1689086 .2053039 -0.82 
Religion 
 
.2672015 .2733159 0.98 
Minorities at Risk 
 
.0377815 .038462 0.98 
Constant 
 
.5058558 .3090672 1.64* 
n=87 cases, 870 observations 
Overall R2 = 0.0087 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 































Z Value Overall R2 
Openness of Exec. 
Recruitment 
.0615924 .0172779 3.56**** 0.0214 
Constraints on the  
Chief Executive 
.0751053 .0216092 3.48**** 0.0207 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
.0224235 .0290222 0.77 0.0077 
Legislative  
Selection 
-.0138069 .0232656 -0.59 0.0074 
Constitutional 
Checks 
-.2232499 .0542364 -4.12**** 0.0261 
Military 
 
.0609313 .0255871 2.38*** 0.0135 
Electoral System 
 
-.0588574 .0211796 -2.78*** 0.0158 
Party Legitimacy 
 
.0114998 .0198766 0.58 0.0074 
Press Freedom 
 
-.0493719 .0219194 -2.25** 0.0128 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
.034713 .0142406 2.44*** 0.0138 
Universal Suffrage 
 
-.0451254 .1098804 -0.41 0.0072 
n=87 cases, 870 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 





















Rule of Law, Bureaucratic Quality 
 
Table 5. Panel Regression for Full Model 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
Index 
 
.0032099 .0029132 1.10 
GNP per capita 
 
-.0000326 .0000278 -1.17 
Literacy  
 
.0027905 .0033227 0.84 
Colonial Legacy 
 
-.3541017 .1688365 -2.10** 
Religion 
 
.221664 .2548419 0.87 
Minorities at Risk 
 






n=62 cases, 992 observations 
Overall R2 = 0.0113 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 































Z Value Overall R2 
Openness of Exec. 
Recruitment 
.0385739 .0158318 2.44*** 0.0160 
Constraints on the  
Chief Executive 
.0658168 .0191818 3.43**** 0.0218 
Legislative 
Effectiveness 
.0209647 .0262619 0.80 0.0107 
Legislative  
Selection 
-.0021047 .0185859 -0.11 0.0101 
Constitutional 
Checks 
-.256803 .0530009 -4.85**** 0.0331 
Rule of Law 
 
-.0348225 .0298268 -1.17 0.0114 
Military 
 
.0395909 .021164 1.87** 0.0136 
Electoral System 
 
-.0434174 .0194768 -2.23** 0.0150 
Party Legitimacy 
 
.0311285 .0173713 1.79** 0.0133 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
-.0035393 .0323424 -0.11 0.0101 
Press Freedom 
 
-.0317501 .0185863 -1.71** 0.0130 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
.0324714 .0136638 2.38*** 0.0157 
Universal Suffrage 
 
-.008765 .0557171 -0.16 0.0101 
n=62 cases, 992 observations 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 



















Table 7. Panel Regression for Full Model 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard Error Z Value 
Index 
 
.0065575 .002617 2.51*** 
GNP per capita 
 
-.0000201 .0000536 -0.37 
Literacy  
 
.000285 .0030756 0.09 
Colonial Legacy 
 
-.3430476 .1584371 -2.17** 
Religion 
 
.192331 .2317515 0.83 
Minorities at Risk 
 
-.0154885 .0350544 -0.44 
Regime Change 
 
.3830606 .0595766 6.43**** 
Constant 
 
-.1135536 .1840359 -0.62 
n=62 cases, 1178 observations 
Overall R2 = 0.0473 
*p ≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 
































Z Value Overall R2 
Openness of Exec. 
Recruitm







































.0215016 .0122612 1.75** 0.0447 
 Executive 
.0885143 .0190014 4.66**** 0.0597 
tive 
s 
.0402624 .0218821 1.84** 0.0450 
tive  .0197957 .0128414 1.54* 0.0442 
tional -.2932017 .058163 -5.04**** 0.0626 
ry .0601387 .01645 3.66**** 0.0530 
ral System -.07336 .016864 -4.35**** 0.0575 
acy .0571121 .0179013 3.19**** 0.0505 
m .0161346 .0184824 0.87 0.0428 
.0613485 .0156506 3.92**** 0.0546 
uffrage .0235602 .0422037 0.56 0.0425 
≤ .10, one-tailed test 
**p ≤ .05, one-tailed test 
***p ≤ .01, one-tailed test 





Appendix 6 – Coding Scheme for the Ordering of the  











































































































































































































































































































































































































n  Exec. 
ent 
18.56 14.16 15.15 14.72 10.61 3.79 6.21 4.35 2.45 3.56 2.44 1.75 2.13 0 1.03 1.14 4.28 2.66 3.82 1.08 5.69 3 
nst. Chief 
utive 
68.82 31.13 48.27 54.10 23.69 7.50 14.51 11.10 4.97 3.48 3.43 4.66 .77 0 1.10 0 1.91 0 .39 1.13 14.05 1 
islative 30.38 15.83 20.51 21.19 20.74 5.82 12.24 11.31 1.60 .77 .80 1.84 1.74 0 1.34 .95 2.96 3.23 4.07 3.09 8.02 2 
islative 
n 
11.10 8.94 5.39 9.78 10.47 3.92 5.40 6.23 .54 0 0 1.54 .68 0 0 1.98 2.69 3.25 5.89 .25 3.90 6 
nstitutional 27.67 7.89 19.27 16.37 12.97 2.89 6.69 2.10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .86 2.01 0 1.21 5 5 
le of Law X X 2.95 X X X 1.92 X X X 0 X X X 0 X X X 9.75 X 2.92 8 
13.97 10.05 11.07 14.42 11.13 7.15 7.06 6.47 3.22 2.38 1.87 3.66 1.66 0 1.26 2.81 .46 .07 2.64 .58 5.10 4 
 





























































































































































































































































































































































35.52 11.33 26.64 25.62 22.62 2.92 14.25 12.70 2.88 .58 1.79 3.19 0 0 0 .51 1.17 4.57 2.44 4.58 8.67 2 
ucratic 
ality 
X X 3.49 X X X 1.88 X X X 0 X X X .40 X X X 5.17 X 2.19 4 
dom 
24.15 4.05 16.32 17.42 19.22 2.01 9.95 11.32 0 0 0 .87 .61 0 1.54 1.81 0 .03 0 0 5.47 3 
ndFair 
ections 
43.88 22.35 33.24 34.96 17.22 5.38 9.65 7.11 3.45 2.44 2.38 3.92 0 0 0 0 1.22 .26 1.62 .35 9.47 1 
versal 
ffrage 
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